260 Chapter XI
volt. He tried to free the port of Antwerp, and sent a loaded cargo vessel down the
Scheldt, only to have it fired on and driven back by the Dutch; but this action fa-
vored only those Belgians who were thinking of the world market, and had no
appeal for the economic interests that had political influence in the estates. Towns,
nobles, and clergy combined against Joseph II, and no Belgian except a few who
worked for the government spoke in his favor. Later, to be sure, by 1790, those
Belgians who had become “democrats” looked on the Hapsburg monarchy with
more sympathy.^33
Joseph began by abolishing torture, decreeing toleration for Protestants, forbid-
ding burial in churches, censoring sermons to prevent political opposition, and
launching an investigation of the University of Louvain, where it was found that
the curriculum had not changed since 1617. To reduce idleness, and increase pro-
ductivity, he suppressed a few monastic establishments that he regarded as super-
fluous, prohibited group pilgrimages, and ordered all kermesses or popular festivals
throughout the country to be celebrated on the same day. He tried to relax the
trade monopolies of the gilds, and ruled that masters might employ as many work-
men as they pleased. Each of these measures antagonized someone.
Belgians began to fear for their constitutional liberties, the more so since in the
thought of the day the “constitutional” was ill defined. There was no sense of two
levels of law, no distinction between the constitutional and the merely statutory,
such as was coming to be felt in America. As in England the Test Act, and even
the game laws, could be defended as essential parts of the constitution, so in Bel-
gium the admission of non- Catholics to public office (few as they were), or the
forcing of reform on the University of Louvain, were regarded as unconstitutional
measures, breaches of the social contract, violations of the Joyous Entry. The abbé
Feller quoted Montesquieu to prove it.
In any case the determined Joseph II, to make the country more amenable to his
rational government, did in 1787 embark on constitutional change, in the sense of
change in the foundation and distribution of public power. He reorganized, unilat-
erally by his own will, the whole administrative and judicial system. Courts depen-
dent on manorial lordships, estate assemblies, and town councils were abolished.
Judicial and administrative power, blended in the old courts, were now separated,
as recommended by philosophers of the Enlightenment. A new General Council
was set up for executive functions, with intendencies throughout the country. Law
courts were uniformly organized into higher courts and courts of first instance. The
reform, like Maupeou’s reforms of 1770 in France, anticipated the progressive de-
velopments of the century to come. But the old courts were basic instruments of
government for the older governing class. And they involved not only the concept
of the constitution but the concept of property, which also was not as strictly de-
fined as it was to be later. Property included property in office, or inherited private
rights in the exercise of public authority.
“Our right to judge is our property, Lord Emperor,” pleaded the nobles of Alost.
“We do not hold it by grace, but have received it from our fathers [hence it was
constitutional] and bought it with blood and gold. It should not be taken from us
33 Mitrofanov, Joseph II, 587, 659–63.