Aristocracy: Theory and Practice 47
observation, using some of the very language of Montesquieu. “The distinction of
ranks and persons,” he says, “is the firmest basis of a mixed and limited govern-
ment. In France the remains of liberty are kept alive by the spirit, the honors and
even the prejudices of 50,000 nobles. Two hundred families supply, in lineal de-
scent, the second branch of the English legislature, which maintains, between the
king and the commons, the balance of the constitution.... The perfect equality of
men is the point at which the extremes of democracy and despotism are
confounded.”^8 So we are offered the choice, with nothing between: hereditary rank
on the one hand, or “perfect equality” (and despotism) on the other.
Montesquieu was not a true conservative, because he was not satisfied with the
way the Bourbon monarchy had developed and was developing in his time. Nor
were the French parlements which after the mid- century drew so many arguments
from Montesquieu by any means conservative, as will be seen. The Parlement of
Paris in 1764 was already using the phrase, “the Sovereign, the Law and the
Nation”—a forecast of “the King, the Law and the Nation” to which men took the
oath of allegiance in the first years of the Revolution.^9
A more purely conservative writer was Real de Curban, an old gentleman born
in 1682, who compiled six volumes on the Science of Government in his later
years. They were published after his death. He anticipated the conservatism of
Burke and the nineteenth century far better than Montesquieu. He takes up, for
example, the much discussed institution of private ownership of public office, es-
pecially the judgeships or magistracies of the parlements. “If it is an evil,” he sighs,
“it is an incurable one.” He poses the question: is it better to continue with it as
established, or to abolish it so that the King’s subjects can rise by merit alone?
“Since public prejudice favors the latter opinion, which I consider false, I have
thought that I ought to refute it.”
Then comes the practical and conservative argument. Of course, if we were
founding a new state we would not make its offices a form of property. “But when
a state is established, when imperfections have become habits, and disorder itself
has a usefulness to the state, prudence forbids making changes.” The prudent man
will conform to custom and usage. Of course we would favor the abolition of prop-
erty in office if it really led to the advantages promised by the reformers, but the
real consequences would be different. If magistrates did not inherit their position,
says Real, they would have to be appointed by the King, which is to say by his
ministers, who, unable to know the merits of all cases in question, would in turn
depend on court gossip and intrigue. Or mere intellectuals (people “with more
Latin than property”) would seek office, which would be undesirable; or business-
men would try to enter government service, which would also be unfortunate,
since they are more useful to society in their business. In any case the present
office- holders are not really so bad, since they regard their offices as investments or
family occupations. Peculiar arrangements (desordres) “which have been introduced
by public necessity and strengthened by reason of state should not and cannot be
abruptly reformed. It is always dangerous for a government to pass from one ex-
8 Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, chap. LXIV.
9 Flammermont, Remonstrances du parlement de Paris au 18e siècle, II, 436.