338 VASApeople of the Ukraine were fiercely independent, and resentful of interference
from the government. But if they so insisted on their independence that all
means of common defence were destroyed, there were powers at hand which
would interfere in a much more painful way. In this respect, the tragic fate of
Ukraine in the seventeenth century provided a foretaste of the fate of the whole
Republic in the eighteenth.^9
The Swedish connection obviously had its greatest impact on the conduct of for-
eign policy. Here it turned the Republic in directions which might otherwise
have been avoided. Despite his dethronement in 1599, Zygmunt III maintained
his title to the Swedish throne. The claim was pursued until 1660. In a monar-
chical age, it provided the legal pretext for the wars with Sweden. These auto-
matically revived the old rivalry with Muscovy. The Muscovite wars in their
turn were closely related to further campaigns against the Turks and Tartars.
In Livonia, till Bathory's time, the principal contest had been that between the
Poles and the Muscovites. After the expulsion of the Muscovites in 1582, it
turned into a struggle between the Poles and the Swedes. Firmly established in
the north of the province, in Estonia, and welcomed by the Protestant burghers
and German nobility, the Swedes quickly tightened their grip. When the inter-
nal crisis in Sweden was finally resolved, Charles IX decided to use Polish
Livonia as a means of rewarding his supporters with lands and offices. Open
warfare began in 1601, and continued intermittently for nearly thirty years. In
1605, at Kirchholm near Riga, a Swedish force was cut to pieces by
Chodkiewicz's Lithuanian hussars, and driven into the sea. But it soon returned
in strength. The Republic was unable to spare the men to garrison this outlying
territory, and every time its attention was distracted, the Swedes made progress.
The decisive campaigns were fought by Gustavus Adolphus in 1617—22 — where
the centre-piece was formed by the fall of Riga, on 26 September 1621 — and in
1625—6, when the conquest of Livonia was completed.^10 (See Map 18.)
With Gustavus Adolphus (1611-32), the Lion of the North, Swedish ambi-
tions were greatly magnified.^11 Having through his Articles of War organized
an army twice as numerous as the forces of the Republic from a population
only one-fifth its size, he needed to fight to keep them fed and diverted. Having
decided to intervene in the Thirty Years War in Germany, he first needed to
secure a mainland base. In 1626, he shipped his army from Livonia to Prussia,
and proceeded to seize the Baltic ports and to tap the Vistula trade for customs
duties. Pilau (Pilawa), Braunsberg (Braniewo), Frauenberg (Frombork), Elbing
(Elblag), and Oliwa were quickly reduced and their treasures sent to Sweden;
but Danzig contrived to resist for the duration. For three years, a series of
Polish counter-attacks made little impression on the splendidly fortified
Swedish bases. The naval encounters were indecisive, although off Oliwa on
28 November 1627, a Polish flotilla managed to drive off a Swedish squadron