TERROR OF THE TURK 361force of heavy Hussars - Sobieski's favourite department, and the agent of all
his greatest victories. The defensive arms - of engineers, sappers, and siege-
layers - tended to be neglected. The army establishment had been fixed since the
reign of Jan Kazimierz at 12,000 men for the Crown and 6,000 for the Grand
Duchy. It was now raised to 36,000 and 18,000 respectively, within the frame-
work of the permanent cadres. Great emphasis was laid on the contributions of
the magnates' private armies. In this, Sobieski led by his own example, dispens-
ing his personal fortune in the service of the state without hesitation. He
belonged to a class who mistrusted the growth of state power and counted more
on the loyalty and generosity of wealthy noblemen. As a result, little was done
to improve the system of military finance. Expenses were assigned to the
provinces in proportion to their capacity to pay. Taxes were often collected with
considerable delay. Responsibility for detailed supervision fell to the dietines.
By virtue of his personality, Sobieski was able to inspire the Republic to unpar-
alleled efforts, in short bursts. But he left the outdated machine virtually
exhausted. In due course, after two decades of overuse, it failed to respond. At
the end of the reign, unpaid soldiery constituted a generalized plague in many
provinces.^5
In origin, the Turkish War was not of Sobieski's making, although he was
closely involved from the start. It had been launched by the Turks as part of
their strategic encirclement of the Habsburgs, and in response to Wisniowiecki's
Habsburg marriage. After Chocim, when Sobieski's victory redeemed the shame
of Buczacz, fortunes were evenly balanced. In 1674-5,the King was hardly seen
in Warsaw, and the royal coronation was repeatedly postponed. The Turkish
siege of Lwow was broken. The fortress of Trembowla was saved by the
courage of the commander's wife who threatened to kill herself if he proceeded
with his intention of surrendering. So long as these dangerous operations were
in progress, Sobieski's policy was paralysed. Yet in 1676, both sides showed
signs of exhaustion. The Polish army was locked in its armed camp at Zorawno
on the Dniester by the overwhelming forces of Ibrahim Sheytan, who none
the less, was unable to break their skilful resistance. On 24 September, a truce
was signed, leaving most of the Turkish gains intact. A Polish embassy
under Jan Gninski was dispatched to the Porte in the hope of securing lasting
peace.
Once the initial Turkish invasion was under control, however, Sobieski
turned to France. Ever since his marriage, he had been closely associated with
the French party at Court. In 1666, he had been offered the baton of a Marshal
of France by Louis XIV, and in 1672 at the head of the French-backed
Confederation of Szczebrzeszyn he had prepared to do battle against the pro-
Habsburg Confederates of Golebie. So, in many ways, a French alliance was the
natural step for him to take. It meant that the Republic would be tied to the anti-
Habsburg combination of France-Sweden-Turkey-Hungary; but it offered
many advantages. It put the French diplomatic service at Poland's disposal in
the search for a Turkish peace, and in the lingering negotiations with Moscow;