THE SAXON ERA 379
panstewko, his own 'state within the state'. He maintained his own clientele of
nobles who defended his interests in the dietines or the courts, and who staffed
his own private army. He conceived his own alliances both domestic and for-
eign, following one of several alternate 'orientations' - Russian, French,
Prussian, or Austrian — according to the dictates of his own finances and incli-
nations. From the early eighteenth century onwards, the power of the magnates
burgeoned. Political life was reduced to the feuds, fortunes, and the follies of a
few families - some, like the Radziwitls, Lubomirski, Sapieha, Potocki,
Wisniowiecki, or Czetwertynski clans were families of ancient distinction;
others like the Sulkowski, Jablonowski, Poniatowski, Tarlo, Czartoryski,
Sieniawski, Oginski, Denhoff, or Branicki broods, were relative parvenus.^8
The emasculation of the Republic was best reflected in the catastrophic
decline of its armed forces. As from 1717, the Komput was indefinitely fixed at
24,000 men - 18,000 for the Korona, and 6,000 for the Grand Duchy. Owing to
the inclusion in these estimates of top-heavy administrative staff, the nominal
establishment was effectively reduced to less than twenty thousand fighting
men. What is more, the Army was deprived of central financial support, and was
expected to support itself by 'exactions' levied on Crown Estates specifically
earmarked for the purpose. Henceforth, each regiment was responsible for col-
lecting its own supplies, and was loath to leave the vicinity of the particular
starostwo on which its survival depended. The Hetmanship was retained; but
the unscrupulous conduct during the Great Northern War of Hetman Adam M.
Sieniawski (1666-1726) in Poland, and especially of Hetman Adam Pociej
(1641-1713) in Lithuania, had greatly diminished the prestige of the office.
Neither the King, nor the Sejm, nor indeed the Army was prepared to entrust
itself to the Hetmans, whose positions rapidly assumed the character of lucra-
tive sinecures, well-greased channels for Russian influence and corruption in the
heart of the Republic's affairs. In such circumstances, the Army's effectiveness
as a fighting force virtually disappeared. Morale and technical proficiency col-
lapsed in almost every branch of the service. In the National Contingent, noble
cavalry troopers commonly absented themselves by offering a couple of sowity
or 'substitutes', usually serfs, in their place. In the Foreign Contingent, commis-
sions were bought and sold, mainly by Germans from Saxony. Only the
Artillery, for whose maintenance the Kwarta tax was now exclusively reserved,
managed to keep itself in some sort of order. At all levels, the soldiers were over-
whelmed by a profusion of self-seeking officers, bureaucrats, and camp-follow-
ers. As the saying went: Dwa dragany, cztery kapitany (For every two dragoons,
we need four captains). In any emergency, the Army's instinct was to retreat to
its permanent quarters in the countryside, and to dig in. It was incapable of con-
trolling the proliferating gangs of bandits, not to mention the private armies of
the magnates. It had no intention whatsoever of challenging the professional
armies of foreign powers.^9
The gravity of the situation was magnified by the fact that the military col-
lapse of Poland—Lithuania coincided with the massive militarization of the