THE END OF THE RUSSIAN PROTECTORATE 389on the other hand, were more cautious. Panin, Catherine's principal adviser on
foreign affairs, held to the older and deeper Russian game whereby rivals were
disarmed by promises of protection, and where the victim was not gobbled sud-
denly but chewed at leisure. Panin had hopes of a Northern System, where
alliances with Prussia, Sweden, and England could be used to confound the
Southern System of Louis XV's Minister, Choiseul. In Panin's scheme, the
Republic was to continue as Russia's advance post in Europe, a vassal protec-
torate whose dependence could be perpetuated by endless manipulation and at
minimal expense. Catherine undoubtedly shared his intentions at the outset;
and one vital strand of the politics of the Partitions can be traced in her pro-
gressive abandonment of the policy of leisurely rumination for that of instant
consumption.^3
Prussia's outlook was somewhat different. In comparison to Russia, it was a
tiny state, whose marvellous efficiency could not always preserve it from the
consequences of insatiable ambition. The seizure of Silesia in 1740 had pro-
voked two decades of wars which all but overwhelmed their instigator. In 1762
with the treasury empty and Berlin occupied, Prussia had only been saved by the
sudden death of the Empress Elizabeth and by the timely accession of Peter III,
Frederick's most fervent admirer. Prussia was in fact a cheerful international
parasite. On three occasions, in 1656, 1720, and 1733 it had been party to
abortive plans for dismembering the Republic. In 1752., Frederick's Political
Testament had likened his Polish neighbour to 'an artichoke, ready to be con-
sumed leaf by leaf'.^4 For the 'Kingdom in Prussia' did not yet possess a consoli-
dated territorial base. The possessions of the Hohenzollerns were scattered
across Northern Europe in unconnected clutches. The two largest elements,
Brandenburg and Ducal (East) Prussia, were still separated by the broad Polish
province of Royal (West) Prussia, which Frederick saw as the first leaf of the
artichoke. After the crisis of 1762, his policy was no more repentant than before,
but more circumspect. Lone banditry had proved too risky. He was now intent
on forming a gang.
The Republic's other neighbour, Austria, lacked both Prussia's dynamism
and Russia's resources. Exhausted by the Seven Years War, the Austrians pos-
sessed more than enough territory to keep their creaking administration busy.
They had no plans of expansion. Their mountain frontier in the Carpathians,
dividing them from Poland, and from Northern Europe in general, was com-
plete except for the one minor gap at Spisz (Zips). In any case they were
Catholics like the Poles, and still remembered the legendary occasion in 1683
when Sobieski had broken the Siege of Vienna. They hated the Prussians, and
feared Russia. It seemed unthinkable that they might make common cause with
Poland's assailants. But they did.^5
Ruling personalities also played a part. Frederick of Prussia, brilliant, cynical,
and unscrupulous, knew exactly where he was going. He was dealing with a
couple of Empresses whose weaknesses he exploited with consummate skill,
flattering the one, and teasing the other. Catherine II, recently elevated to the