200 WOJSKO
ambiguous. In the Battle of Britain in 1940, Polish pilots accounted for some 15
per cent of enemy losses, thus contributing significantly to the salvation of Great
Britain. Yet no reciprocal gesture was ever made by the British, either in 1939-40
or in 1944—5, for the salvation of Poland. At Lenino on the Ukrainian Front in
October 1943, at Monte Cassino in Italy in May 1944, and at Arnhem in
September 1944, Polish units showed immense courage and suffered heavy casu-
alties in the course of operations of doubtful value. At the end of the war in
Europe on 9 May 1945, the First Polish Armoured Division stood at
Wilhelmshaven, the Second Corps at Bologna, and in the east, the First
Armoured Corps was on the Elbe in Czechoslovakia. The only Polish formation
to enjoy a wide measure of autonomy, the underground Artnia Krajowa,
received as little practical support from the Western Allies as it did from the
Soviets. The considerable Polish effort in the war against Hitler was not
matched by any corresponding benefits relating to Poland's future destiny.^8 (See
Chapter 20.)
In the last two centuries, Polish arms have won only one unaided victory. The
'Miracle of the Vistula' in August 1920 is as exceptional in the modern history
of Poland as in the career of the Soviet Army. Once, and once only, the Poles
emerged victorious in single-handed combat with the forces of their great neigh-
bour. How it happened is a matter for debate. It certainly cannot be attributed
to careful planning or systematic preparation. Pilsudski himself called it 'a
scrap', 'a brawl', 'a bagarre', an 'absurdity'. He talked of 'the nullity of forces
available', 'the irrationality of feebleness', and 'the excessive risk contrary to all
sound military principles'. His enemies pointed to the skill of the visiting
General Weygand, to the folly of Tukhachevsky, or the machinations of Stalin,
or even to divine Providence, to anything except the nerve and determination of
Pilsudski. One does not know the full explanation; and so long as the post-war
political censorship prevailed, the Polish public never knew even the basic
facts.^9 (See pp. 394-9.)
In the circumstances, no lasting corporate military tradition could develop
in Poland. Repeated defeats repeatedly slighted the competence of each gener-
ation in the eyes of the next. Momentary hopes were always followed by bit-
ter disillusionment. The officer corps, the regimental units, the military
colleges never enjoyed sufficient success or continuity to bequeath their out-
look and experiences to their successors with any sense of confidence. What
developed, in contrast, was a strong belief in the private virtues of the individ-
ual Polish soldier. Stamina and fortitude in adversity, the ability to improvise,
devotion to the cause, and carelessness for one's own safety, are traits which
won the admiration of comrades in all the armies where Poles have served.
These qualities are celebrated in the vast repertoire of Polish military folklore:
Wojenko, Wojenko, War, Sweet War,
Cozes ty za pani What sort of mistress are you
Ze za to ba ida That you can be pursued
Chlopcy malowani? By all those beautiful boys?^10