To detach from the Soviets as many as possible of the Polish elements already stand-
ing at their disposal...
In the event of a Soviet attempt to violate Poland, to undertake an open struggle
against them.^38
The creation of the PKWN two days earlier showed that the Soviets were push-
ing ahead regardless with their own political dispositions; whilst the Bomb Plot
on Hitler's life at nearby Rastenburg (Ketrzyn) in East Prussia hinted that the
German collapse might be imminent. The Wehrmacbt's partial evacuation of
stores and administrative units from Warsaw seemed to signal the start of their
retreat. But the AK still hesitated. Their supply of ammunition was estimated to
last for only three or four days, and they still had no clear picture of the
German-Soviet tank battle which was shaping up to the east of the Vistula. July
29 was a day of alarms. The pro-communist P.A.L. issued a proclamation,
announcing quite shamelessly that the AK had abandoned Warsaw. Then in the
evening at 8.15 p.m. Moscow Radio broadcast an appeal in Polish urging the
Varsovians to rise: FOR WARSAW, WHICH DID NOT YIELD BUT
FOUGHT ON, THE HOUR OF ACTION HAS ARRIVED. Yet an emissary
from London ruled out large-scale assistance from the West. As the first Soviet
units began to cross the Vistula on to their bridgehead at Magnuszew forty miles
to the south, five armoured divisions of the German Ninth Army under the per-
sonal command of Field Marshal Model moved to the counter-attack to the east
of Praga. At noon on 31 July, a full meeting of Polish military and civilian lead-
ers again postponed their decision. But at 5.30p.m., the local commander for
Warsaw, Col. Antoni 'Monter' Chrusciel (1896-1970), arrived with a report
that Soviet tanks were entering Praga. Bor-Komorowski called in the Chief
Government Delegate, Jankowski, who said 'Very well, then, begin.' Turning to
Monter, he then gave him a brief but decisive order: Tomorrow at 1700 hours
you will start Operation Tempest in Warsaw.' The die was cast.
There can be little doubt that the decision to launch the Warsaw Rising posed
the most tragic dilemma in recent Polish history. It was taken for the most hon-
ourable motives, by men who had fought selflessly for their country's indepen-
dence against all comers from the beginning of the war. Yet it was taken against
the advice of senior military figures like Generals Sosnkowski and Anders; and
it was to have the most baleful consequences for the very cause which it was
intended to serve. On the practical plane, it was precipitated by treacherous
Soviet conduct in the liberated areas, and in the military sphere, by the over-
whelming desire to strike a blow at the Nazi oppressors before they withdrew.
For reasons not then evident, however, it stood only a limited chance of ultimate
success. Its timing, and its underlying strategic assumptions proved to be serious
miscalculations. Its political strategy was fundamentally unrealistic. The deter-
mination to believe assurances from Churchill and Roosevelt that Stalin would
act reasonably was misguided. The plan to seize Warsaw in the brief interval
between the German withdrawal and the arrival of the Soviet Army, was
entirely dependent on military and political intelligence which neither the Soviet
