364 GOLGOTA
Despite the currency of the Declaration of Friendship and Mutual Assistance,
signed by Stalin and Sikorski on 5 December 1941, no chance was missed by the
Soviets to hamper the activities of the Government-in-Exile. The evacuation of
Anders's army from the USSR was only achieved after the Soviets had withheld
its food rations. The talks for post-war Polish-Czechoslovak co-operation were
torpedoed by Soviet protests.^50 The signing of an Anglo-Soviet Treaty in May
1942 was attended by conditions designed to split the British from their Polish
allies. Polish-Soviet hostility was already rising when on 12 April 1943 the
Germans announced their discovery of the Katyn graves. "When the
Government-in-Exile demanded an investigation by the International Red
Cross, the Soviets used this demand as a pretext for severing diplomatic
relations. Henceforth, the Government-in-Exile had no communication with
the one power which exercised control over Polish territory. All future discus-
sion of Polish matters took place between the representatives of the Powers
without Polish participation. The Soviet solution of Poland's future was
gradually confirmed by three great Allied Conferences at Tehran, Yalta, and
Potsdam.
Given the relentless character of Soviet diplomacy over the Polish problem, it
must be recognized however that Stalin's views had changed fundamentally
over the years. In 1939-41, the Soviet dictator had showed a willingness to tram-
ple on every vestige of Polish nationality or independence. From 1941 onwards,
he constantly reiterated his desire to restore 'a strong and independent Poland'.
His understanding of 'strength' and 'independence' differed considerably from
that which was held in Britain and America, or indeed in Poland; but was no less
substantive for that. Anyone who has any doubts concerning the genuineness of
Stalin's commitment should compare the post-war history of Poland with that
of the Baltic States or the Ukraine. Stalin was the author not only of post-war
Polish independence, but also of the peculiarly stunted interpretation of that
concept which prevailed in the post-war era.^51
At the first meeting of 'The Big Three' at Tehran, from 28 November to I
December 1943, discussions on the common front against Germany touched on the
Polish issue. The division of Europe into zones of potential post-war influence
implied that Poland would fall under Soviet control. It was agreed that the Curzon
Line, rejected in 1920, was to form the basis for Poland's eastern frontier.^52 The
western frontier between Poland and Germany was not thoroughly discussed. No
information was made available to Polish representatives at this stage.
At Yalta, between 4 and 11 February 1945, Churchill and Roosevelt made
token efforts to reassert their influence on Eastern Europe. Despite the unilat-
eral recognition of the RTRP by the USSR, they insisted that representatives of
the parties supporting the Government-in-Exile should be admitted to the
Warsaw Government. They recognized Poland's right to lands annexed from
eastern Germany, without defining their extent.
At Potsdam, between 17 July and 2 August 1945, the Powers briskly settled
most of the problems still outstanding. Having briefly consulted with a Polish