THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 431All this emphasizes that Poland's path was not the same as that of other East
European countries. Poland could not be compared with neighbouring
Czechoslovakia where the communists were strong enough to compete for a
time on an open basis, but where they were then obliged to suppress the oppo-
sition by force. Nor could it be compared to Yugoslavia, where the communists
possessed their own power base independent of the Soviet Army. Tito did not
share the same outlook as Gomulka. Both were classified as 'rightist nationalist
deviationists' simply because they happened to fall foul of the Soviets at the
same time as common victims of a tack which was taken not in Poland or
Yugoslavia but in the Kremlin.
The heart of the matter is that Polish political history was governed not by the
Soviets alone, nor by the Polish communists alone, but by the subtle interde-
pendence of the two. It is true that in these early years the Polish communists
could not possibly have survived without the support of the Soviet Army, and
the host of Soviet advisers. But it is also true that the Soviets could not have run
Poland in the way they had chosen without the co-operation of the Polish com-
munists. In this sort of relationship, the weaker partner can often call the tune.
He can threaten to collapse or to rebel. Knowing that Stalin would gain little by
treating the PPR as he had treated the KPP, and that a direct Soviet takeover in
Poland might well rebound against the international standing of the USSR,
Gomulka manoeuvred on the middle ground between open revolt and blind obe-
dience, and established a measure of leverage. When he was removed, his Party
continued to play the same game. They were not encumbered by illusions of
popular support, and were able to survive with a minimum of friction. The
Polish communists were able to trim quickly to Soviet demands; and yet, for rea-
sons of their own pride, and of the national interest, were reluctant to do so. By
1948 they had successfully saddled the cow, but were not disposed to gallop.^26
The exiled Polish Government, which continued to function in London, was
seriously disabled by the creation of a rival, provisional authority in Warsaw. It
ceased to be officially recognized by Great Britain and the USA on 5 July 1945,
and by most other countries in the world thereafter. Yet without doubt, it was
the sole repository of legitimacy, and of continuity with the pre-war Republic.
It still commanded military forces numbering almost a quarter of a million men.
And it was not expelled. Its ambiguous status caused immense complications for
everyone concerned. But for all its tribulations it continued to attract consider-
able respect from Poles both at home and abroad; and it did not fail to play a
role in Polish affairs for the next 45 years.^27
Almost inevitably, the Government-in-Exile (as it now became) was beset by
the splits and quarrels which are endemic in all emigre communities. The fol-
lowers of ex-Premier Mikotajczyk, who had decided to return to Poland, fell out
with the supporters of Premier Tomasz Arciszewski, who were implacably