470 POLSKA LUDOWA
commentators believed that Poland's unique historical development con-
demned her to such eternal contradictions. Others held that the logic of the
situation would eventually force the government to move in one direction or the
other — either towards 'Sovietization' or else towards 'Kadarization'. The
balancing act could not go on for ever. Certainly, Gierek's gamble — to fix up a
quick burst of material prosperity in place of fundamental reform - had not paid
off.
Edward Gierek (1913—2001) owed his appointment to a reputation as a prac-
tical administrator built up during his long term as Party boss in Silesia, and to
his relative independence from the factional intrigues of the previous years. As
a young man, he had spent much of his early career in the ultra-doctrinaire com-
munist parties of France and Belgium, and in the wartime Resistance. He was
the first Party leader in the Soviet bloc who had never been trained in the Soviet
Union. In origin a miner, he had never lost the common touch. Unlike Gomulka,
he was fully aware of the gulf which separated the living standards of working
people in Poland from that of their counterparts in the West, and was willing to
listen to their aspirations. In all other respects, he showed few signs of original-
ity and could be expected to tackle the country's problems with energy, if not
with brilliant ideas. His first step was to order a freeze in food prices for twelve
months. His second step was to visit Gdansk, and to talk to the shipyard work-
ers in person at great length. Tape-recordings of those conversations later
brought to the west, showed that he was fully prepared to admit to the Party's
failures and to pay attention to ordinary folk. On this basis, he won respite to
nurse the morale of State and Party.
Even so, under Gierek's leadership, the political situation in Poland reached
the same impasse at the end of only six years that Gomulka was facing at the end
of twelve. The pattern of events repeated itself in a way that suggests that the
underlying causes of malaise were essentially the same. For three years, in
1971-3, as in 1956—61, the new regime radiated confidence and optimism. Free
discussion, and a spirit of experimentation was in the air. At the Party's 6th
Congress in December 1971, Gierek's team was approved. The workers were
wooed by an increase in wages, and by proper attention to differentials. The
peasants were wooed by the abolition of compulsory deliveries to the state, by
the increase of prices paid for food products, and by the extension of the free
health service to non-state employees. The intellectuals were wooed by the
easing of censorship, and by the lowering of restrictions on travel and foreign
contacts. Patriotic sentiment was appeased by the rebuilding of the Royal Castle
in Warsaw. Contacts with the Polish Emigration, especially in the USA, were
strengthened. The weekly Polityka (Politics) initiated a brand of investigative
journalism which publicized scandal, corruption, and ignorance in the adminis-
tration, and which was subject exclusively to the 'self-censorship' of the editor.
A programme of massive investment was started in those areas of the economy
which might reasonably be expected to increase trade, improve agriculture, or
raise the standard of living. Licences were obtained for the construction in