478 POLSKA LUDOWA
currency, and most lucratively, the ability to exact favours with impunity. According to
rules published in the Dziennik Ustaw (Law Calendar) of 1972, many of these privileges
were invested not just in the incumbents themselves but in their spouses and relatives.From the point of view of the Soviet Union, the system offered maximum control for
minimum effort. So long as the First Secretary of the fraternal party was kept loyal to the
Soviet interest, the whole of the State-and-Party pyramid beneath him could be assumed
to be in line. (It is rather reminiscent of the good old days of monarchical rule, where, by
placing one's candidate on the throne of a client state, one was assured of a dependent
ally.) Yet even here, it seems that little was left to chance. There were a hundred and one
reasons why the secretaries of fraternal parties, conditioned by long years of service in an
atmosphere of adulation for all things Soviet, should have refrained from biting the hand
that fed them. But there were some grave lapses. Moscow could not forget Tito, Imre
Nagy, Mao, or Dubcek. Just in case, therefore, it would make good sense, if the frater-
nal Secretaries were included in the secret personnel policy of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union itself. The existence of an integrated nomenklatura for the whole Soviet
Bloc could only be surmised; but it would have run true to form and would have matched
similar interlocking devices which could be observed in other areas of the Soviet policy.^67The social consequences of the political system were inevitably and unre-
deemably divisive. Contrary to the ill-informed views of outsiders, who often
believed Communist slogans about classless egalitarianism, the society of the
People's Republic, like all other Soviet-style societies, was rigidly divided into
two classes - the Party rulers and the ruled. Independent Marxists might have
called them 'the oppressors' and 'the oppressed':The common attitudes of [the political] Establishment centred less on politics in the
narrow sense than on social power. Firstly, they all insisted on their absolute right to
govern. They behaved as if the state, and all its inhabitants, were their private property.
When... the public debate on the nature of the 'leading role' of the Party eventually
called the nomenklatura into question, an official spokesman would characteristically
declare that 'there is no room for discussion on this point.' Secondly, they instinctively
closed ranks in face of any outside threat. Although they could fight vituperously among
themselves, and conduct purges, and turn on comrades who failed to conform, they
absolutely refused to allow any independent inquiry into their affairs. Explanations of
past mistakes were always attributed to the shortcomings of individuals, never to the rot-
tenness of the system as a whole. Thirdly, they treated the individual citizen with uncon-
scious, unstinting contempt. The idea that the Party's deliberations should be governed
by the wishes and aspirations of ordinary people struck them as bizarre. For Polish soci-
ety was a horse, an animal to be mounted and ridden; and the Party was the rider. (It was
Stalin's own metaphor.) Fourthly, they adopted a life-style which aped the habits of the
old ruling class, and set them apart from the people in general. They wore slightly old-
fashioned executive suits reminiscent of ageing Western businessmen; they spoke to each
other with a special affectation as Wy (You), and to the public in jargon-ridden cliches;
they were driven around by chauffeurs in private limousines with tinted glass and lace
curtains; and their favourite pastime was hunting - hunting in private Party-owned
forests and reserves. Fifthly, they were ashamed of themselves. They conducted their
business behind closed doors; they transmitted their orders by telephone, leaving no trace