The military problem of the war on the Western Front, the only theatre for decision,
was not directly strategic, nor even operational. Instead, the long-insuperable military
problem was tactical. Armies had to learn how to penetrate a continuous, fortified front.
Soldiers had to be able, first, to break into a defended zone that might be 6 miles deep
and contain three (or even six) lines of fortification, protected by vast aprons of barbed
wire; then they had to break through the lines in that zone; and finally they had to break
out of the defended zone and exploit tactical success for operational effect and ultimately
for strategic advantage. In 191 8 , both sides came close to achieving all three steps. The
Germans broke in, broke through and broke out in March and April, but their losses were
too high and their logistics collapsed. As if those near-lethal developments were not
sufficient to doom the great gamble, the operational direction of the offensives on the
Somme and in Flanders was so poor that the incomplete success which was achieved
merely ensured that the attackers created a salient that left them vulnerable to deadly
counter-strokes. In truth, though badly shaken and not always in good order, the Allied
forces that were beaten in the early stages of the German offensives generally were by
no means routed. A similar judgement applies even to the defeat of the German Army
that unfolded remorselessly from July until November 191 8. There was ample evidence
of disintegration: unusually high numbers of prisoners were taken by the Allies; German
guns were captured on a large scale for the first time in the war; overall, the German Army
was becoming ever less able to resist the repeated hammer blows it received during what
is known as the ‘Hundred Days Campaign’ that concluded the war. However, while the
Germans had no option but to yield ground, usually they yielded it only slowly and
continued to inflict losses on Allied forces as heavy as those suffered in any period of the
war. The Germans remained formidable and deadly right up to the Armistice.
When scholars claim that the belligerents mastered modern land warfare in 1914–1 8 ,
and that they carried through a revolution in military affairs in order to achieve and
exploit that mastery, it is well to remember that even the best military practice of 1917–1 8
was distinctly limited in its operational and strategic reach. What follows is a short
discussion of the most important features of warfare in those years. It includes the
innovations that were feasible and succeeded as well as those that were necessary but
impractical at the time.
The military key which unlocked the Western Front was scientific gunnery. World War
I was the Great Artillery War. Precise artillery fire, without precursor firing for target
registration – which would forfeit surprise – stunned or destroyed the defenders, and, as
important, silenced the enemy’s artillery with accurate counter-battery fire.
The artillery revolution, first revealed by the Germans at Riga in September 1917, and
by the British at Cambrai in November that year, could all but ensure tactical victory. At
least it could deliver victory when it was employed as the most vital enabling agent for
a combined-arms approach to warfare. Artillery, infantry, tanks (in the Allied case) and
aircraft all had to play mutually supporting roles. By late 1917 and in 191 8 , 1914-style
warfare was as obsolete as was the infantry square. There was no question of sequential
combat, with artillery, infantry and cavalry each performing its role in its turn, effectively
in isolation from one another.
Tanks were important by late 1917, but not by comparison with the artillery. Aside
from their undoubted psychological effect, the principal utility of the early tanks was in
crushing paths for the infantry through fields of barbed wire. This was not a minor task:
92 War, peace and international relations