9 The mechanization of war
Introduction: revolution in military affairs (RMA)
The principal weapon for war-making in 1914–1 8 was the artillery. Although World
War I compelled the invention of modern combined-arms warfare, it was really the
great artillery war. Infantry and tanks could not advance once they had outrun their
artillery support, except at the cost of suffering prohibitive losses. By way of sharp
contrast, the principal war-making machines in 1939–45 were armoured fighting vehicles
and aircraft. Between 191 8 and 1940 there had been a mechanization of warfare that most
scholars now regard as a revolution in military affairs (RMA). By that we mean a radical
change in the character and conduct of war. However, RMA is a contested concept. Some
historians discern evolution rather than revolution, and they emphasize the complexity
of war and strategy, which can significantly limit the tactical and operational impact of
new technologies (Black, 2004: 225). Moreover, the leading challenge to military estab-
lishments between the wars – beyond the nightmare of unaffordability, that is – was to
decide what doctrinal sense to make of the novel military– technical possibilities.
The previous chapter gave pride of place to the changing political context from the
1920s to the 1930s. However, while broad political subjects were forging and altering
the strategic context, the military dimension to that context was the subject of intense
controversy in all modern states. Everyone needed to make strategic, operational, tactical,
logistical and fiscal sense of the options for mechanization that appeared to be on offer.
No one could afford to be left behind. But each power had different political, and hence
military-strategic, needs. Furthermore, each had distinctive strategic and military
cultures, distinctive recent experiences of war, and distinctive limitations in the critical
realm of affordability.
The technologies for the mechanization of war on land and in the air effectively were
common to all interested states. Two main sets of questions assailed the military
establishments of the period. First, what would work, how well would it work, by when
would it work, and what would it cost? That set was of lesser importance. Countries could