that be achieved? And how long might it take? The German Army advanced on three
diverging axes: Army Group North swept through the former Baltic States, towards
Leningrad; Army Group Centre moved towards Moscow, via Minsk and, in due course,
Smolensk; Army Group South speared into the Ukraine. But which thrust had priority?
Did any of them? It is relevant to note that German military intelligence – almost an
oxymoron – estimated on 22 June 1941 a total Red Army strength of approximately 240
divisions and division equivalents in all theatres. That figure was at least fifty divisions
too low (Boog et al., 199 8 ), with current research suggesting a Soviet order of battle of
303 divisions (Tucker, 2004: 8 4). By the time that the German forces in Stalingrad
surrendered, on 31 January 1943, the Red Army had an order of battle of an incredible
58 1 divisions, a figure which grew to 603 by 1 December that year. However, it must be
emphasized that all divisions were more or less below their authorized strength, and that
Soviet divisions were smaller than German. But German intelligence had absolutely no
detailed information on the location or production capability of the most vital elements
of Soviet defence industry. Of course, if one is supremely confident of achieving com-
plete military victory in a ten- to fourteen-week summer campaign, the potential size and
equipment holdings of the Red Army are not matters for concern.
The strategic story of 1941 in the East was one of apparent triumph, but concluding
with near catastrophe. The Wehrmacht was successful everywhere, at least up to a point.
The Red Army was caught in mid-reorganization and incomplete redeployment forward.
Stalin, its political master, had refused to believe the abundant intelligence about the
impending German attack. The Red Air Force was all but destroyed on the ground on
day one as an effective fighting force. Nevertheless, despite securing Russian POWs by
the million, and advancing hundreds of miles on each axis, the summer passed without
German registration of decisive victory.
The German theory of strategic victory was identical to Napoleon’s in 1 8 12. Both
Napoleon and Hitler foresaw defeat of Russia by means of great envelopments of
Russia’s armies close to the frontier, with the Russian Army expected to collapse as a
consequence. The theory was as unsound in 1941 as it had been in 1 8 12. Leningrad was
not taken. The drive on Moscow was slowed and then stopped, to allow for an opportu-
nistic swing south by the panzers of Army Group Centre to assist Army Group South
around Kiev. In the late summer the Germans could have taken Moscow with relative
ease, had they concentrated upon it as the overriding operational goal. As it was, the
large commitments in the north and the south, the wear and tear on mechanized and
motorized forces imposed by the unprecedented distances that had to be travelled,
the heavy casualties suffered in the fighting and the ever-critical fuel situation translated
into an eventual bid for Moscow that was conducted by a Wehrmacht that was too weary,
too battered, too small and was attacking too late in the year. The Germans had already
lost 400,000 men by the end of August, a figure that grew to the insupportable level of
743,000 by the end of November. That number needs to be considered in the context
of the Eastern Army’s total average strength of 3.5 million.
Hitler was always nervous of the road to Moscow. He was acutely aware of Napoleon’s
dilemma once the Emperor had occupied the city. Was Moscow that important? The
German military high command was firmly convinced that, notwithstanding the Führer’s
enthusiasm for the industrial and historical significance of Leningrad, and the resources
of the Ukraine and the Caucasus, the only way to defeat the Soviet Union rapidly was by
World War II in Europe, I 133