Battle of the Bulge. Hitler assembled in secret virtually the last remaining panzer
reserves available, and concentrated them in the West for what he hoped would be an
operational and strategic replay of the Ardennes thrust of May 1940. In bad weather,
when Allied aircraft were grounded, strong German armoured forces routed some weak
and inexperienced American divisions. They aimed to seize crossings over the River
Meuse, and then to race on in the direction of the vital port of Antwerp, in the process
splitting the British and Canadian forces in the Netherlands from the Americans in
France and Belgium. It was always a forlorn hope. The Germans were short of fuel and
dependent upon bad weather to keep the Allied fighter-bombers at bay. The whole
enterprise was hopelessly ambitious. More to the point, strategically viewed, the armour
and motorized infantry expended in the Bulge were to be desperately needed for the
defence of the capital of the Reich.
In the West, Germany could delay the end by the astute use of prepared fortifications,
especially the Westwall or Siegfried Line of 1939 vintage, as well as urban, hilly and
densely forested terrain that channelled and slowed a cautious enemy. In the East, by
contrast, there were few useful geographical features providing natural protection for
Germany. Given the peril posed by a Red Army which already was investing Warsaw, a
mighty offensive in the West in late 1944 was a luxury Germany could not afford.
1945: vision denied
By 1945 the conclusion to the European tragedy engineered by Adolf Hitler was as
inevitable as it was terrible. After the failure of the Ardennes offensive, and with the CBO
paralysing Germany’s ability either to sustain its armies in the field or to move fuel to,
and products from, industry, the country was running on close to empty. But, incredibly,
it was still running. Field Marshal Keitel did not sign the formal, comprehensive instru-
ment of surrender in Berlin until 8 May. On 29 April, three days before the surrender of
Berlin, Hitler had committed suicide in his bunker.
The strategic history of 1945 from January to May unfolded inexorably. Allied armies
pressed in on Germany from East and West, while Allied bombers continued to do
their best, or worst, to ensure that post-war Germany would resemble a wasteland. The
strategic justification for massive urban bombing in a war that was already won was
exceedingly weak. The problem was that the American and British heavy bomber forces
had reached their peak of near perfection by late 1944. It was impossible to decline to
employ them. This was a case of the triumph of the law of the instrument. The heavy
bomber force existed and now was a tool capable of employment with great precision,
so it would be used.
There were no strategic surprises in the European war in 1945. It was far too late for
the Reich to be saved by a falling out among the Grand Allies; though, admittedly, an
Anglo-American bid to be first to Berlin most likely would have led to heavy fighting
with Soviet troops. The legacy of the thousand-year Reich was rubble: close to 10 million
prisoners of war, the largest refugee flows in history, economic destitution and a geo-
strategic transformation of Europe. Soviet arms were in Berlin, Vienna and on the Elbe,
and they were there to stay.
World War II in Europe, I 139