Hitler’s war
The war was not about Germany seeking to reverse the few remaining terms of the
Versailles Settlement. Between them, Gustav Streseman in the 1920s and Hitler himself
in the 1930s had rendered Versailles a thoroughly dead letter. This is not to forget that
the symbolically politically important and geographically inconvenient Polish corridor
to the Baltic port of Danzig remained outstanding as an issue in August 1939. It is well-
nigh certain that Danzig and the corridor could have been reacquired by Germany
without the necessity of embarking upon a reign of conquest. But Hitler was not
interested in the terms of Versailles, save as a banner to wave to excite Germans, and as
a reminder to guilt-ridden Britons and Frenchmen that injustice had been done.
Hitler’s overriding war aim, for the purpose was intensely personal, never deviated
from the policy implications of the deeply cultural vision that he had outlined with great
clarity in Chapter 14 of Volume II of Mein Kampf, written in Landsberg Prison in 1924.
One cannot improve on his own deathless prose. The words quoted in Box 11.1 state
unambiguously that Germany must expand its national territory by seizing land in the
East, particularly from Russia.
144 War, peace and international relations
Box 11.1Hitler’s vision and war aims as revealed in Mein Kampf
[T]he aim which is to be pursued in our political conduct must be twofold: namely
(1) the acquisition of territory as the objective of our foreign policy and (2) the
establishment of a new and uniform foundation as the objective of our political
activities at home, in accordance with our doctrine of nationhood...
To demand that the 1914 frontiers should be restored is a glaring political
absurdity that is fraught with such consequences as to make the claim itself appear
criminal. The confines of the Reichas they existed in 1914 were thoroughly
illogical; because they were not really complete, in the sense of including all the
members of the German nation. Nor were they reasonable, in view of the geograph-
ical exigencies of military defence. They were not the consequence of a political
plan which had been well considered and carried out. But they were temporary
frontiers established in virtue of a political struggle that had not been brought to a
finish...
The fact that a nation has acquired an enormous territorial area is no reason why
it should hold that territory perpetually. At most, the possession of such territory
is a proof of the strength of the conqueror and the weakness of those who submit
to him. And in this strength alone lives the right of possession...
[W]hen we speak of new territory in Europe to-day we must principally think of
Russia and the border states subject to her...
The future goal of our foreign policy ought not to involve an orientation to the
East or the West, but it ought to be an Eastern policy which will have in view the
acquisition of such territory as is necessary for our German people
(Hitler, 2003: 606, 607, 610, 612, 622)