The course of the war from June 1944 until August 1945 was characterized by skilful
Japanese ground defence of the Philippines (beginning on 20 October 1944 at Leyte),
then of Iwo Jima (19–26 February 1945) and finally of Okinawa (1 April–4 August 1945).
In addition, there were sacrificial assaults by a surface fleet naked of air cover and by
‘kamikaze’ suicide sorties by novice pilots.
American forces gradually – and one must emphasize that it was a gradual process –
closed in upon the Japanese homeland. On balance, American military and naval
leadership was less than stellar. American soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen fought
far better than they were led. The missed opportunity off Saipan has already been noted.
But there were other examples. In the greatest surface battle of the war, at Leyte Gulf on
24–26 October 1944, it is difficult to be certain which side demonstrated the lesser
operational skill. On land, a clear verdict is easier to reach. The Japanese out-generalled
the Americans in the Philippines, a fact for which MacArthur could not forgive his
talented opponent, General Tomoyuki Yamashita (the victor in Malaya and Singapore).
MacArthur had his revenge upon this opponent who had tarnished his reputation for
infallibility by arranging for his trial and execution as a war criminal. On Iwo Jima and
especially Okinawa, the Japanese played losing hands with consummate skill and
terrifying determination.
The end for Japan
But, for Tokyo, resistance was in vain. By July 1945 the country was decisively beaten
in several different respects. The first B-29 raid on Japan from the Marianas, 100 strong,
was launched on 24 November 1944, and from that point onwards what had once been
urban Japan was systematically deconstructed by fire. At sea, Japan was totally block-
aded. American submarines – once they had worked out how to make their torpedoes
explode, by late 1943 – had long since reduced the Japanese merchant marine to a
shadow of its former self. By July 1945 the US Navy had imposed a complete submarine,
surface and air blockade of the Japanese Home Islands. The Japanese at home were
therefore on their own. It did not matter which Japanese forces were still in the field, or
afloat, elsewhere in Asia–Pacific, they were both too weak to intervene in the principal
strategic drama and had no means of returning to provide reinforcements for a last-ditch
defence of the homeland.
The war in Asia–Pacific concluded with two large bangs, on 6 and 9 August 1945.
A single B-29 Superfortress, flying from Tinian, delivered an atomic bomb on
Hiroshima, then another did the same to Nagasaki. By the summer of 1945 the Japanese
were short of everything except fanatical and strategically irrelevant courage. A powerful
faction in Tokyo wanted to fight on. Mercifully, the atomic bombs provided the tipping
weight in the scales that permitted Emperor Hirohito to insist upon surrender. Japan
requested a ceasefire on 15 August and surrendered formally on 2 September. Should
anyone doubt the significance of culture and cultural differences in strategic history, they
could do worse than reflect upon the meaning of a public campaign launched in Japan in
the summer of 1945 that was intended to energize the public to be ready to resist the
invader: ‘The Glorious Death of One Hundred Million’. The war in Asia and the Pacific
certainly had a potent cultural dimension.
178 War, peace and international relations