means necessarily a potent constraint upon decision for action. Not only may a state
command the services of a quasi-religious ideology, as did Nazi Germany and Soviet
Russia, but in some countries – indeed in most countries occasionally – civil society can,
and will, voice demands for war.
Strategic history is an economic story, among others. There is always an economic
context to the record of war, peace and order. Optimistic peace theorists used to argue,
persuasively one must admit, that modern economies and their financing were so
internationally interdependent that war had become impracticable and unprofitable
(Angell, 1911, 193 8 ). Unfortunately, the optimists were proved partially wrong, repeat-
edly. Where they were correct was in their argument that war did not pay, a claim of less
than critical significance because in modern times by and large states have not fought
for economic gain. Governments found ways to finance warfare on credit, rather than
through taxation, by official controls and by currency devaluation, and they bequeathed
to the future the dire consequences of spending grossly beyond their societies’ current
means. Long gone were the days when war could be so conducted that it paid for itself.
The last successful practitioner of profitable predation by war was Napoleon. This is
not to deny that Adolf Hitler made aggression pay in peace and war, but he did so only
for a while: 193 8 –41 to be precise. The economic context to strategic history is always
important; indeed, it is a potential showstopper, no less. Defence preparation and actual
warfare are exercises in economic choice, in affordability, as well as in military judge-
ment. Furthermore, as Germany and then the Soviet Union demonstrated, a major
competitive economic shortfall ultimately will prove strategically fatal, assuming that the
enemy is tolerably militarily competent.
War is waged with the products of technology. At any point in the two centuries
covered here there was a particular technological context. That context was dynamic. It
contained many artefacts from earlier contexts, as well as many prototypes of immature
products that were not quite ready for military prime time. But, at any date from 1 800
until today, statesmen and soldiers inhabited a world with definite technological oppor-
tunities and limitations. In the face of baffling military problems which had grim strategic
implications, technological advance would be accelerated. Sometimes the technological
context evolved with scant influence from the realm of government. It was moved by
strictly commercial or scientific motors. But there is no denying that in the age of total
war in particular, which is to say in the twentieth century, the strategic path in history
played a huge, if not dominant, role in spurring technological innovation.
Next, at all times there is a military-strategic context to policy decisions that may
have consequences for war and peace. This context refers to the contemporary state of
the art in military affairs, what Clausewitz meant by his ‘grammar’ of war (Clausewitz,
1976: 606). When married to an assessment of the strategic meaning of the balance of
military prowess among relevant state, and other, players, one arrives at this useful
concept of the military-strategic context. Some theorists believe that a military-strategic
context wherein offensive capabilities appear to enjoy a significant combat advantage
over the defensive is perilous for peace (Van Evera, 1999). But other theorists find it
unpersuasive to argue that countries go to war when the military context appears to
privilege a bold offence. Politicians are able to persuade themselves that victory is
certain, or at least probable, for a variety of reasons that seem good to them at the time.
Warfare is far too complex an enterprise to be corralled for reliable calculation according
Themes and contexts of strategic history 11