enemy must be punished. In those circumstances, the wonder is not that the Versailles
Settlement and the succeeding treaties with Germany’s allies were decidedly imperfect.
Rather, it is remarkable that the settlement was as moderate as it was. That, of course, is
a subjective judgement, delivered with the benefit of hindsight. The problem was that to
most Germans at the time, and for the next two decades, Versailles was iconic as the
symbol of an injustice imposed by vengeful victors. Moreover, in the opinion of too many
Germans, those foreign victors had not really won the war militarily. In short, the political
context of 1919 was far from ideal for the reformation of world politics. But one might
well be moved to comment that if radical change in state practices could not be intro-
duced in the immediate aftermath of arguably the greatest tragedy in history, when could
it be? Not only was it entirely reasonable that the victorious Allies should attempt to
reform the conduct of international relations, but it was inevitable that they had to try.
The Versailles Settlement was founded, or was declared to be founded, upon five guid-
ing principles: the self-determination of nations; democratization (German, or Prussian,
authoritarianism was held to be guilty of a cultural militarism that led to policies and
behaviour that produced war); open diplomacy, no secret treaties (unlike those negotiated
by all the Allied powers before and during World War I); disarmament (since many
people believed that the war had been caused by the cunning machinations of evil
arms manufacturers, the so-called merchants of death); and collective security. There are
two contrasting opinions about the main problem with the settlement. The first claims
that it was too lenient on Germany, meaning that it would leave it both eventually strong
and vengeful. The second suggests that it was too harsh: it was not well designed for
Germany’s re-entry into the ranks of the basically satisfied, responsible great powers. In
other words, with respect to the latter argument, Versailles undermined the domestic
legitimacy of the Weimar Republic and, as a consequence, lengthened the odds against
the new Germany achieving an enduring political stability at home. What that would
mean for international order and, ultimately, for peace in Europe would depend upon the
changing contexts of future history. Unfortunately, those contexts were not permissive
of long-term stability, either in Germany or in Europe as a whole. Bitter disputes among
the Allies over many details of the settlement, typically with France opposed by Britain
and the United States, subverted from the outset the legitimacy of the Versailles Treaty
and the international order it created.
It is plausible to argue that with respect to major issues of war and peace, the League
of Nations was constructed to give expression to two dominant concepts, both of
which were unsound. It is not only hindsight that commands such a negative verdict.
Experienced statesmen in 1919 should have known that the two concepts were fallacious.
The ideas in question were, first, the moral force of world public opinion, and, second,
collective security. The League was to provide a universal sounding chamber in, and
from, which the global public would voice its opinion. This idea is not entirely ridiculous.
There is no doubt that states can be embarrassed by a barrage of criticism voiced by a
host of otherwise powerless polities in the forum of world diplomacy: then the League,
now the United Nations. The fallacy lies in the belief that principled expressions of
disapproval, often uttered by those who are thoroughly unprincipled themselves, can
serve as powerful restraints upon the behaviour of states. When states are strongly
motivated to pursue by force what they understand to be their vital interests, they are not
readily influenced by the rhetoric of disinterested parties.
War, peace and international order 269