a tactical victory and adapt themselves to the newly created situation. Strategy is a system
of expedients’ (Hughes, 1993: 47). That lethal reversal of the proper relationship between
strategy and tactics was to be a signature feature of German military behaviour in both
of the world wars, with predictable consequences.
Before outlining the essential elements in Clausewitz’s theory of war, it is useful to
pause briefly to offer a not unfriendly judgement upon the theorizing of his rival, Antoine
Henri de Jomini. The latter’s reputation was eclipsed by that of Clausewitz, and has never
staged a solid recovery, but, paradoxically perhaps, ‘Jomini is the most influential theorist
of modern times,’ in the view of historian Daniel Moran. That view extends to the claim
that ‘the practical impact of Jomini’s ideas can hardly be overstated’ (Moran, 2002: 25).
Moran’s judgement on Jomini’s theory of strategy will not be to everyone’s taste, but it
is at least interesting, if not wholly convincing. So what did Jomini offer that soldiers
from early in the nineteenth century until today allegedly have found so irresistible?
Unlike Clausewitz, Jomini promised to instruct soldiers in how to win. Also unlike the
Prussian, he effectively abstracted military science, or the art of war, from its political
context. His theory was advanced as timeless professional guidance, supposedly immune
to changing political conditions. Based on his study and observation of Napoleon’s
campaigns, he advanced a set of rules, presented as principles, which he claimed would
lead to victory if followed. This was what soldiers wanted, and indeed still want, to know:
how do we win? Jomini ‘proposed to show that there is one great principle underlying
all the operations of war – a principle which must be followed in all good combinations’
(Jomini, 1992: 70). His one great principle held that a general should endeavour to throw
the mass of his army against a fraction of the enemy’s forces at ‘the decisive point and at
the proper times and with energy’. This was good advice. Jomini was the most influential
author of a set of principles of war for which he claimed universal authority. These
principles have been much vilified for their ambiguity, even their near banality, and yet
they live on into the twenty-first century, notwithstanding controversy over their utility
(Alger, 19 8 2; Mc Ivor, 2005). Moran points out that Jomini, unlike Clausewitz, lived long
enough to have to deal with the implications for his theory of the new technologies
produced by the Industrial Revolution; and the world developed a great deal between
18 31 and 1 8 69.
Yet he remained insistent that the basic principles of war exemplified by Napoleon,
and codified by Jomini himself, would survive all technological change – a point of
view that has been thoroughly vindicated by events. All good armies today profess
to base their doctrine and operational methods upon ‘principles of war’ similar to
those Jomini identified.
(Moran, 2002: 24)Jomini has received a worse press than he deserves. What are these allegedly universal
principles of war? According to the most recent listing by the US Army in its Field
Manual FM3-0, Operations, they comprise mass; objective; offensive; surprise; economy
of force; manoeuvre; unity of command; security; and simplicity (see Box 2.1). They are
sensible, if not especially helpful. It is worth noting that Clausewitz was by no means
wholly averse to venturing into the terrain of principles, despite his expressed disdain for
sets of rules for warfare. Usually he regarded war as a realm wherein genius and chance
20 War, peace and international relations