War, Peace, and International Relations. An Introduction to Strategic History

Now, well educated with a grasp of the meaning of strategic history, equipped with
themes, aware of context, and suitably armed with Clausewitz’s theory of war, this book
moves on to explain and understand the strategic history of the past two centuries.

Clausewitz and the theory of war 29

7.Friction:The definition, explanation and examples of friction provided in On

Wa rare brilliant and highly original. Unfortunately, the discussion is confined

to one very short chapter (Book 1, ch. 7). Clausewitz has little to say on the

subject of how soldiers and policy-makers might cope with friction.

8 .The policy logic and the grammar of war: On Warmakes plain the properly

dominant role of policy logic, but it also draws attention to the integrity of the

contemporary character of warfare – its grammar, to use Clausewitz’s term

(p. 605). But how does one deal with an emerging mismatch between policy

and warfare? On Waris silent on this crucial matter.

9.Military understanding by policy-makers:‘[A] certain grasp of military affairs

is vital for those in charge of general policy’ (p. 60 8 ). Clausewitz is surely

correct, but what is to be done when those in charge of general policy do not

have a grasp of military affairs? The strategic history of the past two centuries,

up to and including the present day, was well peopled with politicians who

were all but entirely ignorant of the grammar of war. On Warsimply tells us

how things ought to be.

10.Ethics: On Warcontains no ethical discussion of war. Clausewitz’s general

theory of war is entirely bereft of an ethical dimension. This omission, which

is a little strange, given the theorist’s interest in contemporary philosophy, was

of course deliberate. To Clausewitz, war was existential. It was a permanent

fact of history, and it was not formally proscribed by international law until

the Pact of Paris in 192 8 (the Kellogg–Briand Pact). On War, of necessity,

culturally, was a book of its time.

Key points

1. On Waris a philosophical treatise, designed to educate, not to provide practical
   solutions.


2. Typically, strategic thought is triggered by the pragmatic needs of the moment.


3. Clausewitz insists that war has two natures: an ‘objective’ nature that cannot
   alter; and a ‘subjective’ nature, or character, that is always changing.


4. War is political activity by violent means.


5. The core of Clausewitz’s theory of war is his postulate of the trinity of passion
   and enmity, chance and creativity, and policy reason; and the unstable, ever-
   changing relations among them.


6. The difference between the conduct of warfare on paper, in plans, and in reality
   is explained in good part by the compound concept of ‘friction’. The axiom
   that ‘what can go wrong will go wrong’ captures the spirit of this idea.