chapters, technological change was unimportant for the conduct of war on land or at sea.
But Britain’s substantial technological lead in its industrialization was the foundation of
an export-led wealth created by manufacturing that was crucial to the financing of the
seven coalitions that were required to humble Napoleon definitively.
In explaining the strategic transformation tripped by the French Revolution and
then exploited and perfected by Napoleon, this analysis re-emphasizes the dominant
significance of the changing political context. Also, two arguments are introduced that
will reappear repeatedly in later chapters. First, the rise and fall of Napoleonic France
illustrates the perennial strategic truth that enemies learn from each other. In a highly
competitive international system, one wherein states with many similarities struggle for
advantage, any strategic transformation is certain to be copied and adopted and adapted
to local circumstances. No state is able to achieve and then sustain a long strategic lead
over its rivals. Second, the history of Napoleon may be a story of genius, but it is also a
cautionary tale about the particular limits and vulnerabilities that flow from the egotism,
ambitions and illusions that accompany genius.
Limited war and great war
This chapter is about the strategic history of a Europe that was at war, with only minor
breaks, from 20 April 1792, when France declared war on Austria, until 20 November
18 15, the date of the Second Peace of Paris. This protracted warfare was the greatest
strategic episode for a century in either direction, past and future. Although the
eighteenth century was anything but peaceful, Europe had not ended a lengthy general
war among its great powers since the conclusion to the War of Spanish Succession,
1701–14. That conflict was pursued with a ruthless and bloody determination to resist
an aspiring hegemon, the France of Louis XIV. Somewhat closer to the period of con-
cern here, the years 1740 to 1763 witnessed virtually continuous warfare among the
great powers, in Europe, Asia and America, with states changing sides as opportunity
beckoned. As Jeremy Black has argued, the extensive warfare of the middle decades of
the eighteenth century was important for what it revealed about the limitations of
contemporary armies and navies. Much of the military reform of which revolutionary
and Napoleonic France would be the prime initial beneficiary stemmed from lessons
learnt in the 1740s, 1750s and 1760s (Black, 2001: 23).
Moving forward from 1 8 15, the next general European war, which was also a world
war because of the colonial possessions of the belligerents, did not occur until 1914. It
is true that there was a strategically active period from 1 8 54 until 1 8 71, but the wars of
those years were distinctly limited in purpose and restricted in participants.
It would be difficult to exaggerate the multidimensional impact of the wars of
1792–1 8 15 upon the course of strategic history. Britain, for example, was at war with
France from 1793 until 1 8 15, save for a fourteen-month break in 1 8 02–3 (the Peace of
Amiens, 27 March 1 8 02–16 May 1 8 03), and the eleven-month gap between Napoleon’s
first abdication and exile to Elba (11 April 1 8 14) and his subsequent return on 1 March
18 15. The shock, trauma even, of the eruption of these wars can be gauged with the
help of a contemporary authority. No less a person than Britain’s Prime Minister William
Pitt (the Younger) offered a sunny prospect while presenting his budget to the House
of Commons on 17 February 1792. He advised that ‘unquestionably there never was a
From limited war to national war 33