certainly inevitable, failure. Strategic history is a tale of means and ends. All too often,
writers allow themselves to lose the strategic plot in their enthusiasm for the colour and
dash of the means. However, this analysis cannot leap over the military story, since, with
a vital caveat, it is the necessary partner to the negative strategic judgement already
suggested. The caveat is that the details of Napoleon’s extraordinary military career really
do not much matter strategically.
In common with Hitler’s Third Reich, Napoleonic France was condemned by the
character of its leader to eventual, comprehensive and irrecoverable defeat. Napoleon’s
great military and administrative skills postponed France’s fatal meeting with destiny,
but it could only be a postponement. In similar fashion, the superior fighting qualities
of the German Wehrmacht in World War II could only delay the date of inevitable cata-
strophe. There is no avoiding a feeling of some unease with an argument for strategic
historical inevitability. Napoleon’s military and political gifts, though extraordinary, were
lethally inadequate to meet the monumental challenges to statecraft and strategy that the
exercise of those gifts themselves created. But, first, what was the Napoleonic way in
warfare?
In order to understand that way, its strengths and its weaknesses, it is essential to be
clear as to the meanings of, and distinctions among, three key terms: tactics, operations
and strategy. Box 3.1 provides the necessary clarification.
Napoleon imposed a distinctive style of warfare on Europe, but, in detail, he was
not a great innovator. His military modus operandi was a classic example of the total
effect being far greater than the sum of its fairly familiar parts. Although he was certainly
a well-educated soldier in the Royal Artillery, his genius lay in the practical realm of
action. Not for nothing did Clausewitz emphasize the vital role of the coup d’oeilto
genius at work, the ability to sum up a dynamic situation almost at a glance (Clausewitz,
1976: 102). Napoleon’s superior mental gifts generally enabled him to make swift deci-
sions, act boldly and exploit fleeting opportunities. A key to his ability to manufacture
40 War, peace and international relations
Box 3.1Tactics, operations and strategy
- Tacticsrefers to the actual use of armed forces, primarily, though not
exclusively, in combat. In essence, tactics are about how to fight, about military
behaviour itself. - Operationsrefers to the use made of tactics for the conduct of a military
campaign. - Operational artis the skill with which forces are manoeuvred so that they
are well positioned for tactical advantage. But it refers also to the ability to
know when to accept or decline combat, with a view to advancing campaign-
wide goals. Operational art uses the threat and the actuality of battle to win a
campaign. - Strategyrefers to the use made of operations for their impact upon the course
and outcome of a war. Strategy is the bridge between military power and
policy.