Napoleon’s military genius did not lie in any unique understanding of warfare and
how to succeed at it. He did not know things about war that were mysteries to other
professionals. Rather, his genius lay in the ability actually to do what the general wisdom
recognized should be done. Recall that strategy – or, in Napoleon’s case, largely oper-
ations – is an eminently practical undertaking. He had an outstanding coup d’oeilon
the battlefield. He was a brilliant practitioner, by any historical standard, of operational
manoeuvre for battle. He was a genius at inspiring his men; his charisma was extra-
ordinary. Since morale is by far the most important quality contributing to the fighting
power of an army, it is clear that Napoleon’s persona was an asset of almost priceless
value. A further benefit of his charisma was that he enjoyed a reputation which intimi-
dated his enemies. Robert E. Lee and Erwin Rommel exercised a similar, if briefer, hold
over the minds of their foes. In the later years of the Empire, the wiser among his enemies
strove hard to avoid confronting troops commanded by the Emperor himself, sensibly
preferring to cross swords with his marshals instead.
This description of the Napoleonic way in warfare will close with an appreciation from
the Israeli military historian Martin Van Creveld. Commenting on Napoleon’s work
habits while ‘in the field’, Van Creveld has this to say:
Frequently dictating to four different secretaries on four different topics at one time,
Napoleon would send off up to sixty missives a day. Commanding eight corps in the
field in 1 8 05, he still found time to write to his stepson in Italy two or three times
every day, going into the greatest detail as to what was to be done, where, and how.
Reading these letters and appreciating the enormous powers of concentration and of
memory behind them is to experience at first hand the most competent human being
who ever lived.
(Van Creveld, 19 8 5: 64)High praise indeed, but there were problems. As usual in strategic affairs, a new difficulty
arises to harass every solution.
Problems with the Napoleonic way of war and warfare
First, because Napoleon’s armies became too large to be commanded efficiently in
real time by one brain, and because the communications of the period were slow and
unreliable, he was obliged to depend upon trusted subordinates to command his corps,
44 War, peace and international relations
penetration. This was the tactic that won the Battle of Austerlitz against the
Austrians and Russians on 2 December 1 8 05.- On the rare occasions when the French were badly outnumbered, Napoleon
favoured the strategy of the central position. He would strive to place his army
in the middle of the array of his enemies’ forces, exploit his shorter interior
lines of communication, and beat his foes one at a time. - Finally, the Emperor always sought decisive battle with the main body of the
enemy’s forces. He strove to achieve swift and complete victory.