commission of fatal errors. Once he had grasped the unwelcome fact that he had no
naval answer to the Royal Navy, and to the wealth that flowed from the trade protected
by that navy, he was compelled to seek a continental solution to his British strategic
problem. The invasions of Spain and Portugal in 1 808 , the subsequent expensive six years
of Iberian misery, then the invasion of Russia in 1 8 12 were all motivated in large part by
the Emperor’s determination to close the coasts of Europe to British trade. Alas, his
Continental System of British exclusion foundered on the self-interest of continental
demand for the products of the ‘workshop of the world’, as well as on national pride.
Napoleon developed an obsession with the British menace which clouded his judgement.
Sixth, a problem endemic to the predatory imperialism practised by French arms at
the expense of almost everybody else was that it could hardly fail to stimulate a patriotic
response among some of its victims. The misbehaviour of French troops, from Iberia to
Russia, fuelled anger and resentment among all classes and estates. The Grande Armée
was not the bearer of liberty, good government and modernity, or at least not only of those
desiderata. More often it brought impoverishment, famine, murder, rapine, theft and
military impressment. The new French nationalism, actually aggressive chauvinism, all
but obliged other societies to discover, or rediscover, themselves politically in response.
This was not feasible for the multinational empire of the Habsburgs, but it was eminently
practicable for Prussians and other Germans, as well as for Spaniards, Portuguese and
Russians. Political revolution in France, the basis of the Napoleonic way of war, triggered
national feelings abroad which laid the groundwork for more effective resistance to
French aggression.
Seventh and finally, Napoleon’s was an intensely personal way of waging war. Never-
theless, his system of delegated command was necessitated by the Europe-wide scope of
his war-making and by the sheer size of his army. That necessity meant that even if the
Emperor was at the peak of his powers, large fractions of France’s army were commanded
by people whom no one would confuse with military geniuses. A one-man system of war
direction must have the vices of its virtues. Unfortunately for France, though contrary to
the tone of some Gallic hagiography, Napoleon was only human. As the Emperor aged,
his performance was hindered by illness and infirmity as well as by dynastic ambition.
His judgement became erratic and his openness to advice, always limited, was reduced
yet further. The performance of any one-man system must decline when the person who
is its centre of gravity himself declines.
Political and strategic failure
The strategic historian reviews the military detail of Napoleon’s remarkable career and
asks the trademark question of the strategist: ‘So what?’ What was it all about? The
warfare of 1792 to 1794 was about the survival of the new republic and its radical
ideology. But once the First Coalition disintegrated in 1794, with Prussia’s defection, and
collapsed utterly in 1797 when Austria signed the Treaty of Campo Formio (17 October),
it is unarguable that France was waging war simply for gain. Viewed overall, one is
obliged to argue that French, and especially Napoleon’s, strategic performance was a
colossal failure. Despite the Emperor’s undoubted military gifts, and his remarkable
ability to win almost all of his battles, he did not succeed in removing permanently from
the struggle any of his principal enemies. Austria was defeated repeatedly in the 1790s,
46 War, peace and international relations