The armament of armies is still susceptible of great improvements; the state which
shall take the lead in making them will secure great advantages. There is little left to
be desired in artillery, but the offensive and defensive arms of infantry and cavalry
deserve the attention of a provident government.
The new inventions of the last twenty years [1 818 –3 8 ] seem to threaten a great
revolution in army organization, armament, and tactics. Strategy alone will remain
unaltered, with its principles the same as under the Scipios and Caesars, Frederick
and Napoleon, since they are independent of the nature of the arms and organization
of the troops.
The means of destruction are approaching perfection with frightful rapidity.
The Congreve rockets, the effect and direction of which it is said the Austrians can
now regulate – the shrapnel howitzers, which throw a stream of canister as far as the
range of a bullet – the Perkins steam-guns, which vomit forth as many balls as a
battalion – will multiply the chances of destruction, as though the hecatombs of
Eylau, Borodino, Leipzic, and Waterloo were not sufficient to decimate the European
races.
(Jomini, 1992: 4 8 )Jomini demonstrated the typical fallibility of specific predictions, but it is difficult to fault
his general judgement, which is notably complementary to that of Clausewitz.
What occurred was a deadly synergism between material advance and popular involve-
ment in the policy of the state understood as the national cause. The Great War for
Civilization illustrated all too vividly from 1914 to 191 8 that in the later decades of
the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth, the political and social legacy
of the American and French revolutions, married to the products of the Industrial
Revolution, produced an approximation to total war. Although total war is a controversial
concept, it does have a useful definition: a war waged with all the assets of the belliger-
ents’ societies. But the road to the Marne in 1914 was by no means a straight one, and
those who were on it could not know their destination in advance.
Weapons and warfare
After 1 8 15 the governments of the great powers of continental Europe were determined
to restore those barriers of which Clausewitz was to write, designed and operated to
prevent warfare becoming a dangerously popular activity. Strategic history cannot focus
strictly upon the external political context of states; in addition, it must take full account
of the domestic dimension. Naturally, there was intensive official effort to understand
the strategic meaning of the technological developments that cascaded upon military
establishments as opportunities and possibilities. But, in parallel, there was a steady
concern to maintain social control and make military provision of a kind that would not
undermine the traditional social and political order. One reason among several why wars
between great powers in the nineteenth century were rare, conducted with limited means,
and restrained in purpose was that the period 1792 to 1 8 15 served as an awful warning.
Extensive and intensive warfare promoted popular passions and, almost inevitably, led to
social and political revolution. The Franco-Prussian War of 1 8 70–1, though restricted in
Nineteenth century: technology and war 63