tale of woe, by the 1900s some senior German soldiers, including the new Chief of the
General Staff (from 1906 to 1914), Helmuth von Moltke (the Younger), were so con-
vinced that Germany would be unable to win a future war against the Franco-Russian
Alliance that they pressed for preventive war soon, or preferably ‘now’. The rival alliance
systems, and the interlocking logic of competitive mobilizations, meant that any crisis
between the blocs must have the potential to engulf the whole of Europe.
Conclusion
What had the nineteenth century produced, ultimately, in strategic terms? What was its
meaning strategically? The final answer was delivered in 1914–1 8. But here, at the end
of a two-chapter discussion, one must be content to identify the grander of the enablers
of the greatest of great wars in modern times to date. The nineteenth century provided
the people to man mass armies; the population, science, technology and industry to
equip, feed and pay for those mass armies; and a general surge both in national pride and
loyalty, and in an acceptance of militaristic values. There was no effective, enduring
transformation in the norms and practices of statecraft. This is not to deny that the
Concert System retained some modest merit, but the fact was that the century concluded
with Europe, if not poised for general war, undoubtedly structured around two rival
armed, and arming, camps. And nothing has been said here about the effect of the
unpredictable personality of the Kaiser upon the course of events. None of these elements
made war inevitable, but they did make a general war probable, should a great power
conflict occur.
As early as 14 May 1 8 90, Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke spoke all too presciently
to the Reichstag in these terms:
Should a war break out now, its duration and end cannot be foreseen. The largest
powers of Europe armed as never before would take the field. None could be so
completely defeated in one or two campaigns that it would declare itself vanquished
and that it would have to accept the hard peace conditions imposed upon it. None
would promise not to rise up again, even if only after years to renew the struggle.
Such a war could easily become a seven years’ or a thirty years’ war. Woe to him who
applies the torch to Europe, who is the first to throw the match into the powder cask.
(Hughes, 1993: 29)The European stage was set for an acceleration in the pace of strategic history. All that
was needed was for someone to apply the torch.
Nineteenth century: technology and war 73Key points
- There was a deadly synergism between material advance and popular
association with state foreign policy. - The character of land and sea warfare was transformed several times in the
nineteenth century.
continued