54 Nick Atlas
ostensibly disenchant the phenomenon of subjectivity altogether, dwelling
instead on the ways in which first-person experience is ineffable, mundane
and, ultimately, inferior as a science. Anecdotal and statistical examples
are drawn almost exclusively from a Euro-American viewpoint and little to
no attention is given to Eastern and indigenous psychologies, existential-
phenomenological and transpersonal psychology, parapsychology, nor any
other perspective that would otherwise challenge the Western, materialistic
paradigm.
A beneficial first step toward revisioning the uniform approach to
teaching consciousness at the introductory level would be to adequately
delineate between the different ways consciousness is defined cross-
culturally and trans-disciplinarily, as has been alluded to above. Laying all
the cards on the table, so to speak, might seem daunting at first, but will
almost certainly foster rich, expansive dialogue and refined
comprehension. Additionally, the contemporary textbooks reviewed for the
purposes of preparing this chapter—which by no means constitute an
exhaustive list—make no mention of phenomenology, or, the study of the
first-person experience of consciousness. This points to a larger, systemic
bias within the scientific community—namely, the privileging of
quantitative data and third-person observational, or, behavioral science,
over subjective, qualitative reporting constitutive of human science.
Similarly, there is very little discussion about our potential to develop our
faculties of consciousness by way of mindfulness, meditation, and other
forms of experiential learning, all of which can contribute to a drastically
different way of perceiving the world.
In the same way that you would not use a hammer to hit a baseball, a
good scientist ought to acknowledge that different tools are appropriate for
different circumstances. In this case, objective science and replicable,
experimental methods are sufficient for observing an individual’s behavior
and their correlative neurological and physiological functions. Only
subjective methods, however, can yield insight into what it is like to
experience that behavior—to experience consciousness itself. Ideally, the
two approaches ought to co-exist parsimoniously, each one serving a
generative function and fueling inquiry into the other. Sadly, the latter of