Exploring Consciousness: Old Habits and New Horizons 67REVISIONING THE WAY CONSCIOUSNESS IS TAUGHT
In light of our critique of the ways in which contemporary psychology
textbooks treat the subject of consciousness, it is only fitting that I propose
an alternative vision. As has been duly noted, the approach taken by the
authors whose chapters have been reviewed herein is not irrelevant to the
study of consciousness, yet it is incomplete. A more integrative approach
would acknowledge and investigate the hard problem of consciousness—
that is, the problem of consciousness itself—in addition to the easy ones.
Such a curriculum would examine both first-and-third-person observations
of consciousness, coupling the generalizability of quantitative data and
neurological inquiry, for example, with rich, qualitative, highly valid
descriptions of conscious states and subjective experience. Working in
tandem, the two methodologies would give life to a holistic approach that
not only vindicates the historical roots of Western psychology, but also
acknowledges an array of global perspectives on consciousness and charts
an exciting course for the future of psychology.
Firstly, it is imperative that a revised textbook adequately defines the
notion of consciousness, carefully attending to the nuanced ways in which
the term is employed both academically and colloquially. For guidance, we
might revisit Cacioppo and Freberg’s (2016) thorough definition—
“Consciousness refers to knowing or being aware of ongoing experiences
occurring both internally and in the world around us” (p. 194)—and draw
from their delineation between “Consciousness as Variations in Alertness,”
“Consciousness as an Awareness of Ongoing Sensations,” and
“Consciousness as Self-Awareness.” An important next step would be to
devote adequate time to each sub-category, rather than favoring one over
the others on account of convenience or in keeping with the status quo.
Current texts lean heavily on the first category, favoring the objective
study of states of consciousness over inquiry into what it is like to be self-
aware, for example.
Despite the criticisms noted above and several revisions that ought to
be made (i.e., avoiding homogenizing language, monitoring for implicit
biases and moral imperatives, etc.), by and large the existing texts do an