Exploring Consciousness: Old Habits and New Horizons 69bracketing—and the phenomenological reduction. To bracket is to put
aside all knowledge of the phenomenon that is being explored, including
knowledge derived from readings, secondary sources and previous,
personal experiences, prior to examining the phenomenon in question.
Subsequently, the phenomenological epoché is practiced both
theoretically—for example, when setting aside what the investigator
already believes about the subject under investigation, insofar as this is
possible—and experientially by directly perceiving a given state of
consciousness, experience, or piece of data with a beginner’s mind.
The phenomenological reduction refers to the investigator’s refraining
from positing that the phenomenon in question actually exists—that it is
objectively real—as opposed to it merely being present in his or her
subjective consciousness. In this sense, Husserl distanced himself from the
natural scientific, positivist attitude in favor of genuine introspection. He
did not claim that it was impossible to arrive at objective conclusions;
rather, he cautioned that phenomenologists should not mistake their
subjective conclusions for fact. Finally, Husserl suggested that in
formulating an interpretation of a given phenomenon, the phenomenologist
employs “imaginative variation”—an intuitive faculty that delineates
between “which aspects are essential to the appearance of the phenomena
and which aspects are contingent” (Giorgi, 2006, p. 93).
Phenomenology requires us to not take appearances for granted and to
be cognizant of our biases lest they influence our perception. For example,
if we were to employ phenomenology to try to discern what an apple is, we
would have to search for the qualities the apple possesses that make it
distinct from any other object in existence. We could say that the apple is
red and round, though those features alone do not make it an apple. If
observing it from a distance, it would be necessary for us to bracket what
we know about how apples taste. After all, we do not know for certain that
everyone experiences the taste of an apple in the same way, nor do we
know what this particular apple tastes like (or if it has any taste at all). We
could not revert to a description of the chemical composition of an apple,
as our consciousness does not have immediate access to this information.
This exhaustive process of reduction would continue until we arrive at