REALITY CHECK
etween the Internet of Things and smart
cities, by 2030 we expect half a trillion
objects to be connected to the internet, from
streetlamps to autonomous cars, factories
and clothes. The overwhelming majority
will rely on 5G and its successor, making wireless
technology essential to our daily life, our security
and economy. British internet providers are already
upgrading their networks alongside existing 4G
hardware. On the consumer side, the first 5G-capable
smartphones hit the market last year, and the UK
has allowed Huawei to help build ‘non-core’ parts
of the 5G network. This has been met with concern,
because China seems to be building a surveillance
state that is tracking, ranking and controlling its
entire population.
The fear is that the Chinese government could
leverage the data flowing through the parts of
5G AND THE HUAWEI CONTROVERSY:
WHY IS IT ABOUT MORE THAN JUST SECURITY?
InJanuary, the UK government announced that Chinese company Huawei would be allowed to provide
equipment to help build the UK’s 5G network. In response, the US threatened to downgrade the UK’s
access to its intelligence and warned of additional difficulties for trade negotiations. Cyber security expert
Arthur Laudrain unpicks the issues
COMMENT
COMMENT
the network they build to expand their
propaganda and censorship regime beyond
China’s shores.
A MATTER OF VALUES
Pervasive connectivity of the Internet of
Things raises security and human rights
concerns, as the confidentiality of citizens’
data may be at risk.
Back in 2007, local authorities in Estonia
removed a Soviet-era statue; in response,
Russian servers paralysed the Estonian
banking system. Similarly, if there was
a diplomatic or military crisis between
Chinese and European powers – whether
about Taiwan, Hong Kong or the Uighurs –
Huawei may not be able to resist pressures
by the Chinese government to disrupt
public transportation, industry, or energy
grids in Paris, Berlin or London.
A MATTER OF TRUST
To alleviate the UK government’s concerns,
Huawei opened its source code to
selected experts in 2010. So far, audits
have revealed poor software engineering
practice rather than malicious intent.
However, manufacturers can always
remotely update the software running
on these platforms. Usually, this is done
to improve performance, introduce new
features or fix vulnerabilities. Yet they
could be used to covertly introduce back-
door access to the software as well. This
is particularly critical for 5G platforms,
due to their dependence on software
con f ig u r abi l it y.
At best, it is possible to balance these
risks by diversifying providers and
B
“Huawei may not be able
to resist pressures by the
Chinese government to disrupt
public transportation,
industry, or energy grids in
Paris, Berlin or London”
GETTY IMAGES