Peirce|117as a kind of agricultural reserve, land that went in and out of production accord-
ing to demand. Numerous grants of title to mezraas were made in 1540–1541, in
which the land is described as “abandoned and in decline” and “suitable for culti-
vation.” Land and census surveys estimated that the number of rural households
in the provincial subdistrict surrounding Aintab city grew from 1,151 in 1536 to
1,500 in 1543, an increase of 35 percent.
Aintab city too was expanding, but more in dimension than in population.
City households were estimated to have increased by a small margin, from 1,836
to 1,896. The comparative lack of urban population growth was probably caused
by (re)migration to rural communities. What was apparent in the city was a will-
ingness to move away from the cluster of districts protected by the citadel and to
settle farther out, closer to or along routes in and out of the city. Ambition had
replaced fear.
Lesser population growth did not mean lesser urban revenue, at least as
measured by estimated tax assessments. Aintab’s rural revenues rose by 56 per-
cent between 1536 and 1543 and city revenues by 73 percent. Part of this dramatic
increase of course came from the greater ability of authorities to estimate and
actually collect taxes. The challenge for authorities in assessing productivity in a
time of rapid growth is exemplified by the market inspectorship, an office whose
revenue rose when market activity expanded. Like many important posts, the of-
fice was a tax farm. The successful appointee to or winning bidder for a tax farm
contracted to collect taxes due to the state and turn them over to the relevant
authority; his profit came from collecting more than he turned over.
Tax farming was obviously becoming very lucrative under the Ottomans.
The 1536 survey underestimated market-inspectorship revenue at 40,000 akçes
per year, but the bidding wars for the post, recorded at court, reached triple that
amount.The state’s miscalculation was rectified in the 1543 survey, when its
estimate of the post’s revenue was an annual 136,000 akçes. Bidders for the in-
spectorship must have been delighted that Istanbul was slow to capitalize on the
economic upswing. The local artisans and shopkeepers who enriched the market
inspector and his assistants with their taxes were not quite so lucky.
Tax farming was widespread in Aintab. It put money in the pockets of more
people than the tax farmer since the actual collection of the taxes, especially for
a large tax farm like the market inspectorship, was typically subcontracted. For
example, the tax farm for the medicine factory was subcontracted by the inspec-
tor’s office for 480 akçes a year (the amount exacted from the factory was larger be-
cause both subcontractor and inspector expected to earn something). Peasants and
tribesmen could join this game by collecting taxes from their own community—
for example, two brothers from the tribe of Kazak won the bid for taxes on their
tribe by offering 27,470 akçes a year. Thus the trickle-down effect of tax farming
reached numerous settlements in Aintab province. Did the beneficiaries of this