Darling|177governors and officials like them, and their other assistants, soldiers serv-
ing the sword. And what is the work specific to them?... to control the four
classes; to watch over them with justice and with good administration—not
to do whatever they themselves want or know how, but rather to behave ac-
cording to the traditions and opinions of the intelligent and knowledgeable so
as not to commit wrong.... It is not worthy or fitting that people of one class
should be made to leave its work for the work of people of another class by
force. It is certain that this sort of force results in rebellion and disturbance.
Just so, for this reason rebellion and disturbance have been occurring these
several years. Since reaya and village people, as well as artisans and towns-
people, have been driven toward the borders and forced into warfare, the sol-
diers—cavalry and infantry—neglect the battle, the officers become negligent,
the salaried soldiers are distressed, and in the provinces there is such a level of
famine and dearth that things previously bought with one akçe can no longer
be found for ten akçe. In the past these reaya and townsmen were not driven
by force to the battlefield; it occurred [only] from the year 1001 [1592 AD] until
now [1596]. Especially on the frontiers of Croatia and Bosnia, every year at
campaign time the officers have sent men to the province to drive the reaya
from every field and Muslims and artisans from the towns to the campaign by
force; the unfortunate reaya who remain cannot sow the fields, in the mosques
of the towns the [canonical] prayers have not been performed by the [full]
congregation, and since for lack of prayer famine and dearth and all sorts of
calamities have appeared in the province, the military’s efforts have not met
with success and they have deserted the battlefield.Akhisari recommended that officeholders be appointed only from the ca-
pable and the just, although he was not specific about who those might be. These
high officials should pay attention to the army’s unity, supplies, and discipline;
unlike Ali, he considered the origin of the timar-holders less important than
their military capacity, which was being eroded by poor treatment. Command-
ers should provide the army with better equipment and supplies and should arm
the soldiers with the same weapons as their enemies had, since new and effective
weapons tended to give their users victory. The sultan took this advice; when the
war ended in 1606 the role of the sipahis was reduced, and foot soldiers armed
with the new firearms became the main element in the army.
The kadi poet Veysi was more specific in his criticisms. We do not know
much about his life, but his advice work was written for Ahmed I in 1608, after
the war was over. It gave two reasons for Ottoman military difficulties against the
Austrians: the disloyalty of corrupt officials and the unwillingness of the timar
cavalry to fight. The number of militarily active timar holders shrank by close
to 50 percent in the early seventeenth century, though it seems to have grown
again later. Although the Ottomans did flee the battlefield several times, the
later historian Mustafa Naima suggested that the most important causes of mili-
tary failure were the incompetence and political machinations of the army’s high