x Foreword
expanded, some would say diluted, the meanings of friendship, an issue I address in
what follows.
Such varied meanings, coupled with friendship’s contingent and flexible achieve-
ment across social settings, make it notoriously difficult to define friendship con-
clusively. Even so, I offer here five ideal- typical characteristics for recognizing
friendship across diverse circumstances that set the stage for this volume (Rawlins,
1992, 2009). All of these features exist on continua resulting in multiple types and
degrees of friendship. First and foremost, friendship is voluntary. People choose to
regard and treat another person as a friend; friendship cannot be compelled. This
voluntary basis for friendship contrasts with the irrevocable blood- based connec-
tion of kin, the legal and religious sanctions of marriage, and the contractual certifi-
cation of economic and other partnerships. While all of these bonds, except kinship,
may involve initial choices in undertaking the association, factors external to the
relationship preserve the bond until and only when external measures are taken
to nullify its existence. Some argue that this freely chosen quality of friendship
enhances the moral quality of its dedications, even as it makes friendships highly
susceptible to external circumstances. Throughout the life course the demands of
one’s marriage, family, and/ or employment typically take precedence over those of
friends— that is, unless these other bonds include friendship as a dimension, which
can pose other challenges. There is wide disparity in the degree to which friendships
are freely chosen and the extent to which they are a function of their social con-
text. For example, it is often prudent to become friends with professional associates
or seemingly necessary in specific settings to befriend those who share one’s social
position, privileges, or plight.
Second, friendship is a personal relationship. We live in friendship with some-
one because of that person’s individual qualities, not simply because of member-
ship in a certain class or category. This person- qua- person orientation of friendship,
or friendship for the other’s own sake, is considered essential for true friendship
(Aristotle, 1980; Suttles, 1970). Nonetheless, actual friendships vary in the degree
to which dedication to sheer personhood takes precedence. We may in fact become
and remain friends with others because of their singular embodiment of a categori-
cal virtue or commitment to a social cause that we share. Third, friendship is an
affective bond— an emotional attachment. Persons care about, like, and may pro-
foundly love their friends. Again, however, the depth of affect between friends may
range from merely a situational, positive disposition to a lifelong devotion.
Fourth, friendship is a mutual relationship. As a free- standing bond, friendship
is inherently relational; it is accomplished and sustained communicatively and
through shared activities demonstrating each person’s regard for the other. A one-
sided stance of friendship toward another is only would- be friendship. Persons
remain friends to the extent that they continue to meet mutually developed expec-
tations and standards for worthwhile behavior. Fifth and finally, friendship tends
toward an equal relationship. Although friends may differ in their personal attributes