28 United States The EconomistMarch 21st 2020
I
t is hardto pick the best illustration of the administration’s
failings on covid-19. There have been so many.
Having been in the crowd to hear Donald Trump dismiss the vi-
rus as the Democrats’ “new hoax” three weeks ago, Lexington is
still grappling with the president’s denialism. The predictable re-
sult, surveys this week suggest, is that Republican voters are much
less likely than Democrats to consider the virus dangerous or to
take any measure to avoid contracting it. Given that they also tend
to be older, this threatens to bring a dramatic new meaning to the
hoary trope about Republicans voting against their own interests.
Yet the problems extend beyond the president’s rhetoric. John
Bolton’s decision to scrap the nsc’s dedicated pandemic unit is an-
other contender. So is the Centres for Disease Control sticking with
a faulty viral test when the whocould have provided a working al-
ternative; also the turf wars among the White House’s cast of suck-
ups and cronies; and Mr Trump’s latest xenophobic attack on Chi-
na. It is a stunning catalogue of failure.
And its effects could be profound. The Iraq war and financial
crisis fuelled a wave of mistrust in government that helped elect
Mr Trump. The viral plague may end up deadlier than the war and
costlier than them both. Even cool heads are sounding the alarm.
In the AtlanticAnne Appelbaum foresees a devastating national
epiphany—a moment when the country “long accustomed to
thinking of itself as the best, most efficient, and most technically
advanced society in the world, is about to be proved an unclothed
emperor.” In the Financial Timesanother veteran of this newspa-
per, Gideon Rachman, suggests America’s failure on covid-19 and
China’s perceived success could do dreadful damage to democracy.
These are plausible scenarios. The virus is descending on a
country already gripped by pessimism. In “A Time To Build”, the
conservative thinker Yuval Levin discerns a “twilight age” of na-
tional frustration and joylessness, which he ascribes to a part-jus-
tified, morally sapping loss of trust in institutions. In another new
book, “Why We’re Polarised”, Ezra Klein describes the corrosive
role that racially infused partisanship plays in that. He also holds
out little hope of it or the political dysfunction it causes receding,
because of the electoral advantages the Republicans’ lily-white
minority will continue to enjoy, even as it shrinks. By 2045 whitesareexpected to be a minority but, thanks to West Virginia, Wyo-
ming and the other small, mostly white states, the withered hand
of Mitch McConnell could in theory still control the Senate.
Such imposing problems will probably ensure that America’s
adjustment to greater diversity at home and multipolarity abroad
will continue to be rocky. But they need not lead to the head-on col-
lision pessimists fear. America’s fortunes have hardly ever been
smooth (notwithstanding, as Mr Levin has previously described,
rival forms of liberal and conservative nostalgia for an imagined
mid-20th-century golden age). And the country’s traditional
sources of resilience are still apparent—even in the current crisis.
One strength is the flipside of the bureaucratic havoc and buck-
passing that the pandemic has triggered. It is a decentralised and
fragmented democratic system that responds much better to local
than national trials. The federal government defers to the states as
a matter of course on public health, policing and emergency re-
sponse. In the event of a major crisis, this is a recipe for chaos,
which is why the quality of the president matters so much, as
George W. Bush showed in the bungled aftermath of Hurricane Ka-
trina and Mr Trump is showing more grievously. Only he has the
bully pulpit and powers required to cut through the institutional
rivalries, bottlenecks and excessive legalisms that Americans have
intentionally put in the way of central authority.
Yet each cascading layer of American governance offers a par-
tial fix, from governors—many of whom are now battling to fill the
void, led by Mike DeWine of Ohio and Andrew Cuomo of New York
—to hospital boards and sheriffs. And though the main strengths
of this diffuse system—local sensitivity and experimentation—
may now be of secondary importance, their time will soon come.
Meanwhile, the crisis is underlining how asymmetric Ameri-
cans’ pessimism and mistrust of the mainstream is. While Jerry
Falwell junior was informing Fox News viewers last week that co-
vid-19 was designed by North Korea to hurt Mr Trump, mainstream
media organs, universities, other centre-left entities and both the
main Democratic presidential contenders were preaching social
distancing. In 2009 Mr Obama’s $830bn stimulus limped out of the
House of Representatives without one Republican backer; the
House Democratic majority is about to grant Mr Trump’s wish for
even bigger measures. Democrats, unlike many Republicans, still
believe in expertise, objective truth and good government. And the
fact that many blame this disaster on Mr Trump, who represents
none of those things, suggests it will not shake their trust in them.
Indeed they are about to nominate for president one of America’s
most upbeat, undogmatic politicians. Even before considering the
merits of Joe Biden’s policies, this is a basis for optimism.Health tips from Hannity
Ever since Mr Trump’s election, many have asked whether he could
rally the country against a major threat. The worst of their fears
seem to be justified. Yet, for another tentative solace, there is still
some rallying afoot. Fox has abruptly switched from offering con-
spiracy theories to public-health advice. It knows things have got
serious. The pragmatism of many Republican lawmakers—includ-
ing Mitt Romney, an early advocate of individual cash transfers—is
also encouraging. Congress is about to raise its game dramatically.
The functional moment will pass, whenever the crisis recedes,
leaving who knows what devastation in its wake. But amid that un-
certainty, here is another silver lining. It seems increasingly pos-
sible that, in eight months’ time, voters will appraise Mr Trump on
a substantial new issue: his competence to be president. 7Lexington Pandemic polarisation
Covid-19 is exposing America’s resilience as well as its vulnerability