14 Leaders The EconomistNovember 16th 2019
1T
here arefew more emotive words in Latin America than
“coup”, and for good reason. From 1930 to the 1970s, the re-
gion suffered the frequent overthrow of civilian governments in
often bloody military putsches. The victims were usually of the
left. In 1954 a moderate reforming government in Guatemala was
ousted in the name of anti-communism by thecia. Other coups
followed, including that of General Augusto Pinochet against
Salvador Allende, a radical socialist, in Chile in 1973.
Since the democratisation of the region in the 1980s, coups
have been rare. But the very idea has become a potent propagan-
da tool, especially for leftists. Scarcely a week goes by without
Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela’s fraudulently elected dictator,
claiming that he is threatened by one. Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua
says the same. Dilma Rousseff, a leftist presi-
dent in Brazil who spent her way to a second
term in violation of the country’s fiscal respon-
sibility law, also claims that her impeachment
in 2016 was “a coup” even though it followed
strict constitutional procedures.
The latest claim involves the fall of Evo Mo-
rales, Bolivia’s leftist president since 2006. He
resigned on November 10th, fleeing into exile in
Mexico. This prompted a chorus of denunciations of a coup from
the Latin American left and even some European social demo-
crats. This time, at least, the critics are wrong.
True, Mr Morales’s term was not due to end until January. His
fall followed violent protests and a mutiny by the police, who
failed to suppress them. The final straw came when the head of
the armed forces “suggested” that he quit. But that is to tell only a
fraction of the story.
Mr Morales, who is of Aymara indigenous descent, long en-
joyed broad popular support. He imposed a new constitution,
which limited presidents to two terms. Thanks to the commod-
ity boom and his pragmatic economic policy, poverty fell sharp-
ly. He created a more inclusive society.But he also commandeered the courts and the electoral au-
thority and was often ruthless with opponents. In his determi-
nation to remain in power he made the classic strongman’s mis-
take of losing touch with the street. In 2016 he narrowly lost a
referendum to abolish presidential term limits. He got the con-
stitutional court to say he could run for a third term anyway. He
then claimed victory in a dubious election last month. That trig-
gered the uprising. An outside audit upheld the opposition’s
claims of widespread irregularities. His offer to re-run the elec-
tion came too late.
Mr Morales was thus the casualty of a counter-revolution
aimed at defending democracy and the constitution against
electoral fraud and his own illegal candidacy. The army with-
drew its support because it was not prepared to
fire on people in order to sustain him in power.
How these events will come to be viewed de-
pends in part on what happens now (see Ameri-
cas section). An opposition leader has taken
over as interim president and called for a fresh
election to be held in a matter of weeks. There
are two big risks in this. One is that ultras in the
opposition try to erase the good things Mr Mo-
rales stood for as well as the bad. The other is that his supporters
seek to destabilise the interim government and boycott the elec-
tion. It may take outside help to ensure a fair contest.
That the army had to play a role is indeed troubling. But the is-
sue at stake in Bolivia was what should happen, in extremis,
when an elected president deploys the power of the state against
the constitution. In Mr Morales’s resignation and the army’s
forcing of it, Bolivia has set an example for Venezuela and Nica-
ragua, though it is one that is unlikely to be heeded. In the past it
was right-wing strongmen who refused to leave power when le-
gally obliged to do so. Now it is often those on the left. Their con-
stant invocation of coups tends to be a smokescreen for their
own flouting of the rules. It should be examined with care. 7Was there a coup in Bolivia?
The armed forces spoke up for democracy and the constitution against Evo Morales’s attempt at dictatorshipLatin AmericaM
any workersin the private sector no longer have them.
But most public-sector employees in America are still enti-
tled to a valuable benefit: a pension linked to their final salary. A
long-standing problem is that states and cities, which fund their
plans differently from the federal government, have been lax
about putting aside enough money to cover these promises.
The resulting black hole is becoming ever more alarming (see
Finance section). Although the American stockmarket has been
hitting record highs, the average public-sector pension fund has
a bigger deficit in percentage terms than it did in either 2000, or
the start of this decade. In some states and cities schemes are lessthan 50% funded; Illinois has six of the worst.
The cost of pension promises has risen because people are
living longer, so they end up taking more out of the pot. Some
states and cities have responded by trying to wriggle out of their
obligations and cut the benefits retirees get, but courts have of-
ten decided against them, ruling that a contract is a contract. As a
result states, cities and other public bodies are being forced to
funnel ever more into pension schemes. Having chipped in the
equivalent of 5.3% of their ordinary payroll bills in 2001, public-
sector employers now pay in, on average, 16.5% a year.
Even those contributions have not been enough. PoliticiansDependants’ day
America’s public pensions have been underfunded for decades. The crunch point is coming soonPension costs