The Economist UK - 16.11.2019

The EconomistNovember 16th 2019 Asia 51

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Banyan Still negotiating

I

t had lookedlike a complete rupture.

In early September President Donald

Trump tweeted that he had not only

cancelled a summit with negotiators

from the Taliban, but also “called off

peace negotiations”. The hopes that had

been swelling that America and the

Taliban would find a way to end Afghani-

stan’s long, gruesome conflict were

dashed. Instead, America seemed to be

resorting to unilateral measures, trim-

ming its forces in the country from

14,000 soldiers to fewer than 12,000.

Yet this week America, the Taliban

and Afghanistan’s American-backed

government were in contact once again.

The proof was a rare hostage swap. Kevin

King and Timothy Weeks, an American

and an Australian, were abducted by

gunmen in 2016 while teaching at the

American University of Afghanistan in

Kabul, the capital. Now they are to be

released in exchange for Taliban prison-

ers held by the Afghan government in a

deal brokered by Zalmay Khalilzad,

America’s pointman on Afghanistan.

Mr Khalilzad spent a long time pre-

paring the ground for peace talks, espe-

cially getting backing for them from

neighbouring countries such as Paki-

stan. Months haggling with Taliban

emissaries in Qatar followed. By Septem-

ber they had agreed on the outlines of a

deal, to be sealed at the summit Mr

Trump cancelled. The Taliban would

have promised both to prevent interna-

tional terrorist groups like al-Qaeda from

operating in Afghanistan and to enter

talks on the country’s future that would

involve the government, which it had

previously dismissed as illegitimate. In

return, the United States would have

gradually removed most of its troops. Mr

Khalilzad’s efforts marked America’s first

real search for a political settlement

since its invasion in 2001. That toppled the

Taliban but never crushed them.

Mr Trump’s frustration with the negoti-

ations was understandable. He cited a

Taliban bombing that had killed an Ameri-

can serviceman just days before the

planned summit as the reason for the

rupture. But growing criticism from Re-

publican allies, such as Lindsey Graham, a

bellicose senator, must also have unsettled

him. They worried that the negotiations

were a mere cover for capitulation.

The release of three senior Taliban

captives in exchange for the professors

will also gall American hawks. The trio

were an organiser of suicide bombings, an

uncle of the Taliban’s deputy leader and

Anas Haqqani, brother of Sirajuddin, the

head of the ruthless Haqqani network—in

effect, the leader of the Taliban’s military

operations. Yet some analysts read the

swap as a signal not only that the two sides

are talking again, but also that the Haqqani

network, the most violent and radical

element of the Taliban, is ready to be part

of any settlement.

America, meanwhile, has no good

alternatives to talks. Simply to withdraw

its forces, as Mr Trump might prefer,

would be to admit that nearly two de-

cades of American policy has failed. It

would intensify the conflict, weaken the

Afghan government and risk a proxy war

driven by the likes of India and Pakistan.

Yet the Taliban, too, have reasons to

negotiate. They have the advantage on

the battlefield—by controlling vast rural

areas, sending suicide bombers into the

capital and making shocking raids on

provincial cities. But they know they

cannot win the war.

What is more, the limbo in Afghan

politics—the results of a presidential

election in September are still being

tallied, and may lead to a second round

in the spring—is not as much of an obsta-

cle to peace as it seems. The Taliban have

long wanted to negotiate a power-shar-

ing deal with a broader range of gran-

dees—including local strongmen, civil-

society groups and politicians of all

stripes, not just the government. If that

model is taken up, then the uncertainty

about the outcome of the election will

matter less.

And what if this all goes pear-shaped?

Laurel Miller of the International Crisis

Group, a think-tank, is surely right in

arguing that for American troops to

remain in Afghanistan in perpetuity—an

idea which General Mark Milley, chair-

man of the joint chiefs of staff, seemed to

approve of this month—is no Plan b. For

a start, under Mr Trump, no American

commitment can be trusted. His abrupt

withdrawal of troops from northern Syria

points to what he could do in Afghani-

stan—with disastrous consequences. All

the more reason for the Afghan govern-

ment to explore an accommodation with

the Taliban. For ordinary Afghans peace

cannot come soon enough.

Why no one can afford to call off peace talks in Afghanistan

these crimes are “false monks”—either re-

cent initiates with little religious educa-

tion or thieves donning maroon robes in

order to steal nats’ offerings more easily.

However, this explanation may simply be a

way to avoid direct criticism of revered mo-

nastic authorities. Han Tun believes that

the monks he encountered intended not

only to steal donations but “to violate, to

intervene with our beliefs”. Khin Swe Oo,

the custodian of the shrine in Taung Pyone,

believes the individuals responsible are in-

spired by prominent monks who fulmi-

nate regularly against nats in widely dis-

seminated sermons.

The main focus of Ma Ba Tha, a radical

Buddhist organisation which was banned

in 2017, was to alert Burmese to the threat of

Islam. One of its leading members, a monk

called Wisetkhana, does not believe that

devotees of nats pose nearly as great a

threat to Buddhism as Muslims do, nor

does he condone the violent treatment

meted out to them. But he has written a

book that argues nats are evil. It is called

“Protecting the Race and Religion”. 

Not all monks abhor the spirit cult. A

few years ago Khin Swe Oo asked Zawana

Nyarna and other local abbots for help in

preventing the attacks at Taung Pyone.

Monks from local monasteries now ob-

serve the festivities, interrogate threaten-

ing monks, disrobe them if they are impos-

tors or send them home if they are genuine

monks. “Because of their help, it’s getting

better,” says Han Tun. But as Khin Swe Oo

leans back in the bamboo chair in front of

her house, just a stone’s throw from the

shrine, a pagoda covered in gold leaf, she

closes her eyes. The attacks are still hap-

pening, she says. The burden of protecting

the spirits weighs heavily on her. 7