3 CONFERENCES AT PRAGUE AND BERGEN AND THE LOOMING WAR 325assistance, of non-aggression, on naval and air force limitation and on
non-fortification among the principal Far Eastern nations.^302
In their introduction to a summary of the discussions at Virginia
Beach, Mitchell, who was now assistant to the IPR’s secretary gen-
eral, and Holland provided a brief review of the developments that had
occurred the Far East in the eight months that had lapsed since the meet-
ing. Clearly, the authors considered that many of the views expressed at
the meeting had been borne out by recent history. Commenting under
the heading of ‘The Impact of the European War on the Far East,’
Mitchell and Holland noted that the situation in China continued to
be in a state of deadlock. They noted that Japan had failed to establish
an effective puppet regime in China. The terms on which the Nanjing
regime had been established on March 20, 1940, had made it apparent to
the Chinese of all classes that Japan was determined to subjugate China
and to monopolise her national resources and industrial development.
As a consequence of this, the regime had failed in its attempt to enlist
the support of any key groups among the Chinese population. Lacking
any political authority, the regime remained reliant on Japanese military
force. Meanwhile, the political solidarity on which the Chinese resistance
was based remained intact: as long as the Japanese continued to aggress
in China there would be ‘no serious political split within Free China.’^303
Mitchell and Holland observed that the effectiveness of the resistance
movement had been enhanced ‘by the intensification of guerrilla warfare,
the development of new economic bases in the interior, the training of
vast numbers of new troops, and the gradual but still too slow mobilisa-
tion and training of the people for mass resistance.’^304
Mitchell and Holland contended that against this background, the
possibilities opened up by the war in Europe for depriving China of for-
eign support must have seemed like manna from heaven to the Japanese
government. However, they added, with so much of Japan’s military
assets tied up in China, the government of Yonai Mitsumasa ‘hesitated to
take full advantage of the new situation by a direct attack on the holdings
(^302) Ibid.
(^303) Mitchell and Holland, eds., Problems of the Pacific, 1939, 1–2. For Mitchell’s new role,
see ‘Appendix 1: Study Meeting Membership and Committees,’ ibid., 274.
(^304) Ibid., 2.