Story of International Relations

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328 J.-A. PEMBERTON


new government would align itself with the Axis powers. Mitchell and
Holland stated that although there had been no indication of this as yet,
it was clear that the new government would adopt a much more aggres-
sive stance in relation to Britain and the United States than had the pre-
vious government should these countries not accede to the imposition
Japan’s New Order.^313
Mitchell and Holland observed that the supporters of an expansionist
policy in Japan appeared confident in the belief that Japan could directly
attack Western holdings in the Far East with impunity because of the
weakened position of Britain and France. They stated that this meant
that in all likelihood the United States would have to decide at some
point ‘whether to stand firm in opposition to further Japanese aggression
or to reach some compromise arrangement with Japan at the expense of
Chinese independence.’^314
Mitchell and Holland further observed that although opinions dif-
fered in regard to the course it might choose, it was clear to all that
the United States had moved to elevate its bargaining position vis-à-vis
Japan, such as by abrogating its trade treaty with that country. They
pointed out that many were of the view that the continued presence of
the American fleet at Hawaii was a sign that the United States intended
to be a dominant player in any peace settlement in the Far East. They
added that recent statements by Senator (Arthur) Vandenberg, Walter
Lippmann and others advocating a policy of accommodation with Japan
as ‘essential for safe-guarding American security in the Pacific...[were]...
significant indications of this trend in American opinion.’^315
However, as Holland and Mitchell stated in concluding their account
of political developments in the region since the conclusion of the study
meeting at Virginia beach, the view of members at that meeting was that
the interests of the United States in the Pacific were best secured not
by accommodating Japan, but by establishing a ‘strong and independ-
ent China and discrediting Japan’s militarist policy.’^316 Further to this,
they pointed out that members had maintained at the meeting that the


(^313) Mitchell and Holland, eds., Problems of the Pacific, 1939, 4–5. See also Singleton
(NSW) Argus, July 17, 1940; and Madera Tribune, July 16, 1940.
(^314) Ibid., 5.
(^315) Ibid., 5–6.
(^316) Ibid., 6.

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