338 J.-A. PEMBERTON
However, Carr did not, ostensibly at least, eliminate the question of
justice entirely from the frame of his analysis of peaceful change. Rather,
what he did was to present justice and peace as potentially competing
values between which compromises may need to be made. Munich was
one such compromise. For Carr, however, this compromise, while cer-
tainly involving submission to the power element, that is, to threats of
force, was not devoid of a moral element: ‘the common recognition by
the Powers...of a criterion applicable to the dispute: the principle of
self-determination’.^350 Indeed, Carr gave himself grounds for adding
to the supposed moral dimension of the Munich Agreement: in com-
mencing a chapter devoted to the topic of peaceful change he opined
that where a change is ‘necessary and desirable,’ those who employ or
threaten to employ ‘force to maintain the status quo may be more mor-
ally culpable’ than those who employ or threaten to employ force in
order to change it.^351
Carr suggested that once the dissatisfied states had discovered that
their grievances might be remedied by peaceful means, a discovery which
he stated would be ‘preceded no doubt in the first instance by threats
of force,’ they would embrace a process of conciliation.^352 As we saw,
Toynbee had strongly denounced the British ‘efforts [in 1935] to seek
a solution to the “Italo-Ethiopian dispute” which would accommodate
both aggressor and victim’. However, according to Donald Cameron
Watt, in 1936 Toynbee would find himself under attack by anti-appease-
ment forces because of his ‘apparent efforts to accommodate his work to
a much more dangerous threat to Britain and to his view of civilisation
than that constituted by Mussolini’s Italy.’^353
As we have seen, Toynbee was at least willing to consider the pros-
pect of colonial appeasement. He seemed to think that it might be possi-
ble to appease Germany in this respect while at the same time upholding
the principle of trusteeship as enshrined in Article 22 of the covenant
and retaining the League’s system of mandatory supervision. McNeill
(^350) Ibid., 282.
(^351) Ibid., 264-65.
(^352) Ibid., 272.
(^353) Donald Cameron Watt, foreword to Bosco and Navari, Chatham House and British
Foreign Policy 1919–1945, iii.