The Economist USA 03.28.2020

The EconomistMarch 28th 2020 Special reportThe African century 7

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The forever wars

Some parts of Africa could be violent and unstable for decades to come

O

n the edgeof a shallow ravine in the

far western corner of Burkina Faso

two vehicles bristling with machine guns

come to a stop. Several bearded white

men lean out, keeping watch for jihad-

ists. Nearby, other Western soldiers are

helping their African counterparts stage

a mock attack on an insurgent base.

These are some of the special forces

from a number of Western countries who

have been fighting jihadists in the Sahel

for years. Many Western army and in-

telligence officials see extremists in the

region posing a greater danger than the

remnants of Islamic State in Syria and

Iraq. America has sent about 6,000

troops to Africa, France 5,100 and Ger-

many 1,100. There are almost as many

Western troops in Africa as those fighting

the Taliban and Islamic State.

Yet most foreign leaders are keeping

quiet about it, worried that they will get

little public support at home. President

Donald Trump has reduced America’s

troops in Africa by about 10%, against the

wishes of his generals, and is considering

a much deeper cut.

That is worrying because the jihadists

are getting the upper hand. Last year more

than 10,000 people lost their lives in vio-

lence related to Islamist groups in Africa.

Mali, whose capital almost fell to jihadists

in 2012 before French forces stepped in, is

at the centre of the turmoil. Much of the

countryside in its vast north has fallen,

despite a unpeacekeeping force that is

15,000 strong. Now the extremists are

spilling out into neighbouring countries.

Burkina Faso, which was stable a few years

ago, has lost control of the triangle of

territory in its north, which borders Niger

and Mali.

Western security officials had hoped it

could act as a bulwark to stop the insur-

gents crossing over and destabilising

coastal states such as Ghana and Benin.

Now they are drawing new lines of de-

fence. François Lecointre, chief of staff of

the French armed forces, has said his

troops will be in the Sahel “for the next 30

years”. Brigadier-General Dagvin An-

derson, who commands American special

forces in Africa expects “a generational,

multinational effort”.

Stopping the jihadists will require not

just troops, but also schools, economic

development and accountable govern-

ments. Countries in the Sahel are not

helped by climate and topography. Their

people are poorer, less educated and have

stubbornly high fertility rates. Just as

countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia are

slowing their population growth, women

in countries such as Niger continue to

have more than seven children each. The

region’s rapidly deteriorating security is a

warning to the continent as a whole of

what may happen if its growing numbers

of young people are not educated or are

unable to find jobs at home or abroad.

The Islamist jihad has caused more

than 1,000 schools to close across west

Africa, leaving almost 2m children out of

school. In one village of 6,000 people

outside the city of Maiduguri in north-

eastern Nigeria, near the border with

Niger, the only education that the village’s

2,000 children get is learning to recite the

Koran. There is not a book in sight, just the

rhythmic chanting of children rising into

the afternoon heat.

Oromo activists in America played a key role in the protests that

have pushed Ethiopia in a more democratic direction.

It is not just politics that is being transformed but also busi-

ness. Some returnees are actual rocket scientists such as Kwami

Williams, a Ghanaian-born American who studied aerospace engi-

neering at mitand was about to take a job at nasabefore he

changed course and set up a business in Ghana. Or Ikenna Nzewi, a

Nigerian-American who studied computer science at Yale before

teaming up with two pals from mitand Duke to set up a business,

Releaf, to collect and process palm-oil kernels from smallholder

farmers in Nigeria. Rather than migration leading to a “brain

drain” or “brain gain”, it is actually circular, with people moving,

learning new skills and then moving again, says Stephen Gelb of

the Overseas Development Institute (odi), a London think-tank.

The second big wave of migration is people moving within Afri-

ca. More than half of African migrants stay on the continent, most

of them travelling along well-established migratory routes such as

one that links Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast. There, about 10% of

the population are migrants yet they generate close to 20% of its

gdp. Migration boosts productivity in many other places. A study

by the oecdfound that because foreigners working in South Africa

brought skills that were missing from the labour market, they did

not take jobs from locals. Instead they helped boost employment

and wages of South African-born workers, bumping up income per

person by as much as 5%.

Countries that send migrants elsewhere in Africa also see many

benefits through trade and investment. Lots of people like to eat

the food they grew up with, so many end up importing it after they

have moved elsewhere, an effect big enough to stand out in trade

statistics compiled by unctad. This is also true when they move to

the rich world. They are creating a cultural melting-pot of music

and film, too. “African youth culture is going to have a fundamen-

tal influence on global youth culture,” argues Cobus Van Staden at

Wits University. It is exportable because it is open and “deeply in

conversation” across cultures, he says, citing as an example how

musicians from different African countries collaborate.

The third great migration is the shifting of people from the

countryside to cities. Africa’s population is still largely rural, with

just 41% living in cities. But this is changing fast. The number of

1987 2015

Autocracy

Closed

anocracy

Open

anocracy Democracy

Colony No data

Sources: Wimmer and Min (2006); Centre for Systemic Peace

Freedom breaking out

“Democracy Score”