0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
$3.5 billion
2009
SOURCES: S&P GLOBAL, BLOOMBERG
2019
FITNESS
2011 2013 2015 2017
GARMIN ANNUAL REVENUES
27. 9 %
44 FORTUNE APRIL 2020
company. “He literally knew my wife
and kids’ names,” says Rick Evans,
who worked for Garmin from 2000
to 2016. “And he knew that about
everybody.”
Such tightness would come in
handy when times got tough in the
late 2000s. The company was soar-
ing in 2007, when it had some 40
different in-car GPS models for cars,
trucks, and motorcycles. The automo-
tive segment had become a $2.3 bil-
lion business, more than doubling its
revenue from the previous year and
representing nearly 74% of overall
sales. Then came the iPhone, which
Apple released in the middle of that
year with Google Maps loaded on
all phones. The first version of the
iPhone lacked a GPS chip, relying
covered Garmin for 15 years.
Kao, who remains Garmin’s execu-
tive chairman and was CEO at the
time, kept calm and focused invest-
ments on the nonautomotive parts
of the company’s business. Over the
next decade, for example, Garmin
bought more than 25 companies
around the world, mostly distribu-
tors of navigation equipment that
broadened its geographic reach.
It also bought access to weather
information as well as contactless
payments technology it would embed
in its wearable devices. Pemble, the
CEO, says Garmin never lost sight of
the need to grow. “The most efficient
thing to try is to double down on
growth and opportunity,” he says.
“Saving money and cutting expenses
never really works.”
Garmin’s product innovation was
hardly flawless. In 2008 it debuted
the Nüvifone, its own GPS-enabled
smartphone that eventually used
Google’s Android mobile operating
system. Expensive for its day at $300
retail, the phone had a touch screen
that wasn’t very responsive and often
confused swiping and tapping. Its
camera was low-quality and didn’t
include video. And Garmin charged
users $6 to check the weather, traffic,
and local events—things Apple and
other phonemakers offered for free.
The company exited the smartphone
business after two and a half years.
G
ARMIN PROVED TO BE at its
best when it plodded along
at product development, the
antithesis of Silicon Valley’s
mantra of moving fast and
breaking things. It helped that the
company made products for regu-
lated industries, particularly aviation,
where precision is more important
than time-to-market. “I had worked
for Apple and seen how quickly they
could move,” says Matt Ronge, a for-
instead on more rudimentary technol-
ogy to pinpoint locations. But within a
year, Apple incorporated GPS, making
its phone a multifaceted replacement
for Garmin’s stand-alone devices.
Garmin’s business took an almost
immediate hit, and its problems were
exacerbated by the financial crisis.
In 2008, the stock price collapsed,
falling below $16 a share from highs
of more than $120 in 2007. As Wall
Street had feared, revenue declined
by $500 million in 2009, to $3 bil-
lion. Though Garmin remained sol-
idly profitable—it earned $704 mil-
lion that year—investors were rattled.
“Back then, [investors] would come
in and say, ‘They’re going to get put
out of business,’ ” says Ron Epstein,
a Bank of America analyst who has
“The biggest challenge is getting that mass market to understand w
TRADING PLACES
As Garmin’s automotive business, the in-car navigation gadgets that made the
company a household name, has dwindled, fitness watches and trackers have
picked up the slack.
GAR.W.0420.XMIT.indd 44 FINAL 3/10/2020 1:28:27 PM