Eye on Korea_ An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations

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Once I gave a briefing to his staff officers regarding China, where I had trav-

eled the year before. In those days China was still a closed country for the

most part, so this briefing was in great demand. At any rate, we became good

friends, and I must confess that he made a very favorable impression. He

exuded self-confidence and walked with a sort of permanent swagger. Later

he was promoted to full general and eventually became chief of staff of the

army before being abruptly removed by Pres. Kim Young Sam. I would see

him again often in the years to follow.

Official U.S. Contacts with Chun Doo Hwan

Just as Colonel Kim influenced my own thinking, Major General Chun him-

self was quite skillful at convincing the U.S. Embassy that democracy was

still possible. By late January, , Bob Brewster had established direct

contact with him. I am not certain how often or how regularly they met,

but it was often enough for Brewster to form some opinions as to future

developments. I believe these opinions were generally optimistic.

Indeed, there was reason for optimism. Despite earlier fears, the consti-

tutional order had been preserved. In addition, some political prisoners had

been released and media censorship, while still prevalent, was not exercised

with the same iron hand that it had been earlier. Controls were relaxed as

well on political activities on college campuses. In February dissident Kim

Dae Jung was allowed to participate in the political process once again. This

was particularly significant, for he had a large following in the United States;

the relaxation of restrictions on his activities resulted in some favorable

press reports in Washington.^1 The combined effect of these events was

enough that embassy reporting during this period continued to have a

positive tone.^2

In mid-February Gen. John Wickham met with Major General Chun.^3

This was the first meeting between the two since /. I am not certain

why General Wickham changed his mind about talking with Chun, but I

believe that this time the idea for such a meeting came from the American

side.^4 There was a feeling at United States Forces Korea Headquarters that,

since the embassy was now meeting with Chun on a fairly regular basis, it

no longer served any useful purpose for Wickham not to meet with him.

Also, Wickham was still under criticism in Washington for not having taken

a strong enough posture with the younger ROK Army generals after /—

this may also have been a motivation.

At this meeting General Wickham emphasized the same points that had