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CHAPTER 9

Kwangju and Its Aftermath

T

he first hard evidence that the authorities would return to full

martial law rather than a negotiated settlement occurred on May

, , when Korean military authorities notified Combined

Forces Command of their intent to withdraw elements of the th

Division from CFC OPCON.^1 This later became quite a controversial issue

(which I will discuss shortly), but at the time it was treated rather routinely.

In response, CFC authorities acknowledged the notification but requested

that alternative forces be assigned. While this was being discussed, events

elsewhere began to move very rapidly.^2

Concerned at the apparent turn of events from reconciliation to the hard-

line stance favored by Chun Doo Hwan, Ambassador Gleysteen once more

visited the Blue House on May .^3 We had heard rumors that Kim Dae Jung

or other dissident leaders might be arrested, and Gleysteen warned Blue

House Secretary General Choi Kwang Soo that any such action would likely

lead to increased violence. By now, of course, the decision to declare com-

plete martial law had been made by the military, and Pres. Choi Kyu Ha’s

recall was only for the purpose of having him rubber-stamp the decision.

That same evening the U.S. Embassy was officially notified that full martial

law would be reimposed throughout South Korea beginning at midnight.^4

About the same time, we began to receive reports of the arrests of some stu-

dent leaders and opposition politicians, including Kim Dae Jung, Kim Young

Sam, Kim Jong Pil, and others. Soon thereafter the National Assembly was

closed at bayonet point. It appeared that this martial law would be even more

harsh than previous versions.

Ambassador Gleysteen was dismayed.^5 He was instructed by Washing-

ton to deliver a sharp protest to the Blue House, which he did on the eigh-

teenth, the first day of martial law. He met with President Choi, who by now

had returned to Seoul and had formally authorized these actions. Choi jus-

tified himself by saying that the alternative was to totally lose control of the

government because of the inability to contain the demonstrations.

Gleysteen responded by calling for the immediate release of the opposition