Awarded for Valour_ A History of the Victoria Cross and the Evolution of the British Concept of Heroism

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NOTES 251

84. Register, 222.


85. Ibid., p. 126.


86. Ibid., p. 19.
    CHAPTER 7
    
    
    1. Eric Montgomery Andrews,The ANZAC Illusion: Anglo-Australian Relations During World War I
       (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 44.
    
    
    2. John Gooch, ‘The Armed Services,’ in Stephen Constantine, Maurice W. Kirby and
       Mary B. Rose, eds,The First World War in British History(London: Edward Arnold, 1995),
       187–90; Johnson,Breakthrough!, 116–18.
    
    
    3. Brown,Book of the Western Front, 70–1. Letter from Second Lieutenant Gordon Bartlett,
       1/5th King’s Liverpool Regiment, to his parents, 13 March 1915.
    
    
    4. Register, 83, 240.
    
    
    5. Lyn Macdonald, 1915:The Death of Innocence(London: Headline Books, 1993), 134.
    
    
    6. Edward Spiers, ‘Gallipoli,’ in Brian Bond, ed.,The First World War and British Military
       History(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1991), 165–88. Spiers examines four periods of
       interpretation. The initial wartime and immediate aftermath assessments were highly
       critical of the cost of the modest achievements of the campaign as well as the high
       command decisions of Kitchener, Churchill, and Hamilton. The initial condemnation
       of the operations generated a series of rebuttals during the 1920s; including from
       the official history Brigadier General C. F. Aspinal-Oglander’s multi-volumeMilitary
       Operations Gallipoli(1929–32), Winston Churchill’sThe World Crisis, 1915 (1923), and Sir
       Ian Hamilton’s two-volumeGallipoli Diary(1920). These works tended to take a position
       defending the campaign in initial conception and then offered a variety of excuses
       as to why it failed. Another wave of Gallipoli revision took place after the Second
       World War, beginning with Alan Moorehead, Gallipoli (1956) and J. F. C. Fuller,
       The Decisive Battles of the Western World and Their Influence Upon History(1956) and Maurice
       Hankey’s devastating insider report of the management of the war effort,The Supreme
       Command, 1914–1918(1961). The general trend in this period was to blame the failure
       on incompetence at the highest levels of both civilian and military authority. More
       recently authors have centered their attacks on local command ability as the primary
       deficiency in the campaign. Both Peter Liddle inMen of Gallipoli(1976) and John Laffin,
       Damn the Dardanelles!(1989) blamed Hamilton for the failure of the venture. The one
       common thread through all interpretations is that the campaign failed to accomplish
       any of its objectives, and wasted a lot of lives in the process.
    
    
    7. John Laffin,Damn the Dardanelles!(Gloucester: Alan Sutton, 1989), 49–50.
    
    
    8. Geoffrey Moorehouse,Hell’s Foundations: A Social History of the Town of Bury in the Aftermath of
       the Gallipoli Campaign(New York: Henry Holt, 1992), 65, 129–30.
    
    
    9. PRO File ADM 1/8528/176. Letter from Major-General A. Hunter-Weston to D.A.G.,
       General Headquarters, 15 May 1915; Undated endorsement of recommendations signed
       by General Ian Hamilton, General Officer Commanding, Mediterranean Expeditionary
       Force.
    
    
    
    


87. Ian Hamilton,Gallipoli Diary(London:Edward Arnold, 1920), 222–3.


88. PRO file ADM 1/8528/176. Letter from Major-General A. Hunter-Weston to D.A.G.,
    General Headquarters, 15 May 1915.