March9,2020 BARRON’S M5
THE STRIKING PRICE
In the dark days of the credit crisis, the financial
world was seemingly ending. Yet some people set
themselves up to make fortunes.
In Times Like These,
Be Like Warren Buffett
W
hen fear defines financial
markets, remember Warren
Buffett. The great investor
once said the secret to beat-
ing the market was to be fearful when oth-
ers are greedy and greedy when others are
fearful.
It is a simple idea, but it’s hard to do,
especially now, when no one knows what
the coronavirus might do. Right now, it ex-
ists as a widespread yet not especially lethal
outbreak, though some—like Buffett’s
friend Bill Gates—fear it is a once-in-a-
century pathogen. President Donald Trump
insists that political opponents are using the
virus to destabilize his administration. And
the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates
by half a percentage point, driving the 10-
year Treasury yield to a historically low
level in order to blunt its impact.
It isn’t worth debating any of this be-
cause the stock market tells us everything
we need to know. The Dow Jones Industrial
Average dropped by 12% for the week
ended on Feb. 28, and the S&P 500 index
and the Nasdaq Composite each lost 11%. It
was the market’s worst week since 2008,
and the volatility this past week has also
been extraordinary.
That raises a key point. In the dark days
of the credit crisis, the financial world was
seemingly ending. Yet by March 2009, the
worst was over, and some people set them-
selves up to make fortunes because they
bought stocks during those dark days.
The great indicator that led them to buy
when everyone else was selling was often
their own discomfort. When the tape made
them feel that they wanted to vomit from
the stress, they bought stocks and sold
bearish put options to buy stocks even
lower. Others concluded that widespread
interest in hedging stocks during the
crisis—a sign of panic because it shows an
insensitivity to price—suggested that the
market would stop declining.
This isn’t meant to imply that the coro-
navirus will soon stop menacing the mar-
ket. No one knows what will happen to-
morrow. But if you invest today in a blue-
chip stock, values may fluctuate, but your
future investment will almost certainly be
worth more—provided the virus doesn’t
destroy the world.
Since the credit crisis, we have encour-
aged investors to practice “time arbitrage”
by taking advantage of current conflagra-
tions in anticipation of better tomorrows.
If you can buy and hold for a few years,
today’s problems probably won’t be so
severe.
To follow Buffett’sfear dictum, consider
the humble cash-secured put strategy,
which entails selling puts on quality stocks
while setting aside the purchase price of
the underlying stock in your brokerage
account. Find stocks you can own for a few
years or longer, and sell one- to three-
month puts with strike prices that are just
below the stock’s price.
Favor stocks likeAT&T(ticker: T), with
a dividend yield of about 6%, orVerizon
Communications(VZ), with a yield of
4.5%. If the virus worsens, people will still
speak on their mobile phones, surf the
internet, and watch TV.Netflix(NFLX),
the king of streaming content, should do
well, too.
The put strategy is simple. If the stock
advances rather than declines, you keep the
premium. If the stock is at the strike price
at expiration, you buy the stock. The real
risk is that the stock falls far below the
strike price, and investors must cover the
put at a higher price or buy the stock at the
strike price even if it is trading lower. The
strategy works for any stock you are will-
ing to own until brighter days return.
Our fear strategy is like disaster prep-
ping. Rather than hoarding water, ammuni-
tion, and canned goods, you are stockpiling
quality stocks that often pay attractive divi-
dends when many investors are fearful.
This isn’t for everyone, naturally, but those
who dare tend to win.B
By Steven M. Sears
Equity Options
CBOE VOLATILITY INDEX
VIX Close VIX Futures
10
20
30
40
50
AM J J A SO ND J FM
Daily Values Source: CBOE
THE EQUITY-ONLY PUT-CALL RATIO
Put-Call Ratio S&P 500 Index
45
80
115
150
185
220
255
290
AM J J A SO ND J FM
Source: McMillan Analysis Corp.
SPX SKEW
Implied volatility %
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15%
AM J J A SO ND J FM
Source: Credit Suisse Equity Derivatives Strategy
NDX SKEW
Implied volatility %
8
9
10
11
12
13%
AM J J A SO ND J FM
Source: Credit Suisse Equity Derivatives Strategy
Skew indicates whether the options market expects a stock-market advance or decline. It measures the difference
between the implied volatility of puts and calls that are 10% out of the money and expire in three months. Higher
readings are bearish.
Week'sMostActive
Company Symbol TotVol Calls Puts AvgTotVol IV%ile Ratio
Opko Health OPK 193309 191163 2146 5192 100 37.2
Forty Seven FTSV 15308 7115 8193 452 0 33.9
Genmark Diagnostics GNMK^6619643818126099 25.5
Cypress Semiconductor CY 9332 3414 5918 552 99 16.9
ABM Industries ABM 2223 714 1509 216 99 10.3
Ocular Therapeutics OCUL^17190159061284172496 10.0
Omeros Corp. OMER^16517112765241187661 8.8
Covetrus CVET 8323 6620 1703 948 93 8.8
Big Lots BIG 63574 55679 7895 8092 99 7.9
Barnes & Noble BNED^3403329710644495 7.7
Guidewire Software GWRE 11134 2780 8354 1748 91 6.4
Huntington Bancshares HBAN 34841 3911 30930 5740 100 6.1
Eldorado Resorts ERI^91335567723456316284100 5.6
5th 3rd Bank FITB 50804 23985 26819 10092 99 5.0
Quest Diagnostics DGX 11696 10423 1273 2384 100 4.9
Brunswick BC^4398580381892495 4.8
Brookdale Senior Living BKD 14195 2002 12193 2984 98 4.8
BioCryst Pharm BCRX 45598 44815 783 9516 98 4.8
Inoviio Pharm INO 270466 219589 50877 57516 100 4.7
United Natural Foods UNFI^11378204993292436100 4.7
Thistableofthemostactiveoptionsthisweek,ascomparedtoaverageweeklyactivity–notjustrawvolume.Theideaisthatthe
unusuallyheavytradingintheseoptionsmightbeapredictorofcorporateactivity–takeovers,earningssurprises,earningspre-
announcements,biotechFDAhearingsordrugtrialresultannouncements,andsoforth.Dividendarbitragehasbeeneliminated.In
short,thislistattemptstoidentifywhereheavyspeculationistakingplace. Theseoptionsarelikelytobeexpensiveincomparisonto
theirusualpricinglevels.Furthermore,manyofthesesituationsmayberumor-driven.Mostrumorsdonotprovetobetrue,soone
shouldbeawareoftheseincreasedrisksiftradinginthesenames
RatioistheTotVoldividedbyAvgTotVol.IV%ileishowexpensivetheoptionsareonascalefrom0to100.
Source:McMillanAnalysis