flightglobal.com 10-16 March 2020 | Flight International | 35
737 MAX
Trainingthe most commonly voiced exclamation on
the flightdeck became “What’s it doing now?”
Throughout this period – indeed, before
it – the 737 series was doggedly present,
its flightdeck gradually developing through
four iterations of the aircraft from an ana-
logue/electric interface to digital/electronic
by the time the highly electronic Max entered
service in 2017.
COMMERCIAL TRAINING
Meanwhile, the pilot supply had been chang-
ing, too. Gone was the military as the primary
source of aviation training; it has been re-
placed by a massive worldwide industry of
commercial training providers. This industry
has been primed to supply licensed pilots at
the lowest possible price to an airline indus-
try looking for the lowest possible pilot induc-
tion cost, followed by the lowest possible
recurrent training cost.
Of course, the airlines also want the highest
possible pilot quality, but given the economic
imperatives under which the training indus-
try operates, it is reasonable to wonder how
many of the graduate pilots could possibly
achieve that level. Ryanair’s former head of
training, Captain Andy O’Shea, has famously
said that more than half of them have not
reached an adequate standard, despite being
awarded licences.
During the US Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) investigation of the 737 Max since
its grounding, it set up the multinational Joint
Authorities Technical Review (JATR) team
as an independent group to look at the big pic-
ture. One of its most profound – but simple –
statements is that systems design “must not
rely on pilot action as a primary means of risk
mitigation”. Also, says the JATR, assumptions
about pilot reaction to system failures need to
be reviewed in the light of the complexity of
aircraft systems and a new generation of pilots
trained in different ways.
JATR head Christopher Hart told the FAA:
“As aircraft systems become more complex,
ensuring that the certification process ade-
quately addresses potential operational and
safety ramifications for the entire aircraft that
may be caused by the failure – or inappropri-
ate operation – of any system on the aircraft,
becomes not only far more important, but also
far more difficult.”
FAA administrator Steve Dickson concurs:
“The lessons learned will ideally lead to a
more holistic, rather than transactional item-
by-item approach to aircraft certification – not
only in the US, but around the world, where
we will more effectively integrate human
considerations throughout the design process
as aircraft become more automated and
systems more complex.”
Meanwhile, in a recommendation related
to the introduction of the Max that may sound
the death knell for “grandfather rights”, the
JATR says: “The FAA should be provided
[by the manufacturer] all system differences
between related aircraft in order to adequately
evaluate operational impact, systems integra-
tion and human performance.”Summing up the need for change in de-
sign for the man/machine interface – or, to be
more precise, the need to design a workable
relationship between a pilot and what is
effectively a network of integrated systems,
Hart continues: “Other specific [JATR] rec-
ommendations relate to revisiting the FAA’s
standards regarding the time needed by pi-
lots to identify and respond to problems that
arise. Although existing standards have
served the industry well for decades, the
JATR members recommend an examination
of whether those standards are as appropri-
ate for the complex integrated systems in to-
day’s airplanes.”MULTIPLE ALARMS
For clarity, Hart adds: “For example, when
the failure or inappropriate operation of a
system results in cascading failures and mul-
tiple alarms, query how adequately the certifi-
cation process considers the impact of multi-
ple alarms, along with possible startle effect,
on the ability of pilots to respond appropri-
ately. Inherent in this issue is the adequacy of
training to help pilots be able to respond ef-
fectively to failures that they may never have
encountered before, not even in training.”
The return of the Max to service is not only
about the approval of new software and sys-
tems redesign, it is equally dependent on the
FAA and other NAAs agreeing an approved
pilot training regime to qualify them on the
modified Max. The airlines would each also
have to satisfy the regulators that they have
prepared appropriate training arrangements.
This would obviously entail a complete type
rating course for those not rated on earlier 737
marques, and a differences course for those
who are. It has already been agreed that the
latter will entail time in a capable flight simu-
lation training device.
The importance of pilot preparation has
been heightened by revelations in internal
emails within Boeing that Indonesia made it
clear in June 2017 that it wanted Max simula-
tor time for its carriers’ pilots. Boeing, howev-
er, talked it around, persuading airlines that
computer-based training was sufficient. The
manufacturer is not arguing this time.
There is very little doubt that a programme
to return the Max to service will begin some-
time in summer, and it will be successful. But
this episode means Boeing will never think
the same way again about the relationship
between its increasingly sophisticated aircraft
and their pilots.
Meanwhile, thousands of the world’s faith-
ful Boeing pilots are wondering whether the
company is finally heading for sidesticks and
more complete flight envelope protection. But
the good news is that absolutely no-one is
talking about the elimination of pilots from
the equation. ■Re-engined 737’s return to service will depend on updates of both training and systems
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