w aging w ar to t ransform the w orld 95Wilson had left himself with no choice but to break diplomatic rela-
tions with Germany. Soon thereafter the British intercepted and
published a telegram from the German foreign minister to the Mexican
government that off ered it help if it decided to go to war with the
United States. It was a foolish and clumsy move that angered the
American public, but few took seriously the threat. Th e submarine
attacks were a diff erent matter, however, and Berlin’s refusal to revoke
the order fi nally drove Wilson to ask Congress for a declaration of war
in April 1917.
Taken as a whole, Wilson’s efforts in the thirty-plus months of
American neutrality demonstrated a mixture of political savvy, moral
rigidity, and diplomatic naiveté that brought the United States into a
global confl ict. A skillful politician in the domestic arena, he under-
stood American public opinion and what it would tolerate. Had he
pushed harder for a military buildup after the start of the war in
Europe, he might well have split his political coalition and found
himself too far ahead of a reluctant public. Further, he came to grasp
that German militarism threatened a global economic order in which
the United States had assumed the leading role. Were Germany to
prevail on the battlefi eld, it would coexist uneasily at best with the
economic leviathan that had emerged in the Western Hemisphere.
(Preparedness advocates and army planners who conjured up future
German invasions overstated the underlying confl ict of interests but
did not misconstrue it.)
On the other side, Wilson was slow to appreciate that American
economic leverage was a two-edged diplomatic sword: it could only be
used in ways that would do grave harm to the power that wielded it.
He could have avoided confrontations with belligerents had he
accepted Bryan’s recommendations that they ship American goods in
their own hulls. Adamant on matters of principle, however, he insisted
on neutral shipping rights of little practical significance. I have
observed how this left the choice between war and peace in German
hands. In his high-minded attempts to mediate an end to the confl ict,
Wilson also failed to recognize what the conflict had done to the
psyche of the warring nations and their governments. Th ey used his
idealism—his vision of a settlement with no winners leading to a world
without war—to manipulate him. As events would show, Wilson and