w aging w ar to t ransform the w orld 103punitive expedition. Th ere he had avoided antagonizing the Mexican
government despite roaming freely over the border. Although
Pershing, too, was a Republican, he had shown that he could pursue
the administration’s political objectives even without close oversight
from Washington.
Whether Pershing was the right general to command an army of a
million or more men in battle remained a great unknown. We should
recall again Eliot Cohen’s observation that at the start of a war a political
leader has no choice but to select from among unproven senior
officers. That was every bit as true for Wilson as it had been for
Lincoln. In 1917 the U.S. Army had no offi cers who had commanded
large bodies of troops in combat. Although Pershing’s Mexican expe-
dition had reached a maximum of 15,000 men, most of the time it had
been a brigade-size force of about one-third that number. H e h a d
handled it credibly, but Wilson quickly decided that the force to be
assembled under the general’s direction would be vastly larger, with
correspondingly greater organizational, logistical, training, and
planning challenges.
Pershing also had strong beliefs about how the AEF ought to fi ght:
he was persuaded that the Allied armies had become too cautious, and
he intended to imbue his troops with a strong off ensive spirit. Here he
revealed the risks that the army had incurred by the failure to send
observers to study trench warfare firsthand over the previous three
years. American offi cers had yet to comprehend the killing power of
modern weapons and the advantage these gave to troops defending
positions over those on the attack. Given the general’s lack of expe-
rience in handling a mass army and the gap in his knowledge about the
war in Europe, Wilson’s decision to entrust him with broad discretion
represented a major gamble.
It is striking, moreover, how little communication Wilson had with
his key military subordinate before he sailed in May 1917. Th e president
held only one face-to-face meeting with Pershing, and it was essentially
a social visit. At that session, to the general’s evident surprise, Wilson
declined to discuss the pending campaign or ask for an explanation of
military options. Still, the two were on the same page. Secretary of
War Newton Baker communicated to Pershing that his core mission
was to make certain that American forces would operate independently